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FOREWORD
This collection of papers and resources on aerospace management is an outgrowth of
recommendations issued in 1986 by the NASA Management Study Group, better known as
the Phillips Committee. A key recommendation emphasized the need for formal training
and development of program and project managers within NASA. A Program/Project
Management Steering Group, established in 1984, set out to develop a management
experience library to support those formal training and development programs, seeking
lessons learned, policy, tools and development information. The result is Issues in NASA
Program and Project Management.
The statements and opinions of the authors are their own, and do not represent official
policy of NASA or of the U. S. Government. In fact, some viewpoints in this document will
challenge those of other authors, encouraging a diversity of ideas and approaches for NASA
managers, future managers and NASA alumni.
A few words about our authors and their offerings:
Deputy Administrator Dale D. Myers leads off this publication with a brief discussion of the
Program Approval Document which served NASA so well in earlier years. He was NASA's
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight from 1970 to 1974 and has since had a
distinguished career in government and industry. James B. Odom shares the guiding
management principles which he developed as Director of the Science and Engineering
Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center and NASA's Associate Administrator for Space
Station. Aaron Cohen, Director since 1986 of the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in
Houston, Texas, sets the stage with an overview of project management and the evolution of
the matrix concept within the Johnson Space Center culture. He came to Johnson Space
Center in 1962 and is recognized as one of NASA's premier program/project managers.
Angelo Guastaferro, vice president of Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., and director of
space station programs at the California corporation, had served 16 years for NASA at the
Langley Research Center. After promotion as deputy manager of the Viking Project, he
served as director of the planetary division of NASA's Office of Space Science and then as
deputy director of the Ames Research Center for four years, until 1985. C. Thomas Newman,
Assistant Deputy Administrator for NASA, presents a paper on controlling resources in the
Apollo Program, in which he served as chief of resources control. He served also as deputy
comptroller since 1977 and Comptroller since 1981. The late Homer Newell, former chief
scientist for NASA, reflects upon the center/headquarters headaches, based upon his own
experiences with the Goddard Space Flight Center in the early 1960's. He is author of
Beyond The Atmosphere (1981) from which this article is excerpted. Jack Lee is deputy
director of the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. He writes about the
evolution of the technical management organization at MSFC, zeroing in on the
multinational Spacelab Program. Manny Peralta provides a broad overview of training and
development initiatives for NASA program and project management workforce. He serves
as Associate Administrator for Management in NASA's Office of Management after 30 years
of industry experience in business, engineering and project management. William M.
Lawbaugh, an associate professor of communications, also served as assistant editor of
Issues in NASA Program and Project Management. Inquiries should be directed to Frank T.
Hoban, program manager, Code ND, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546.
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The PAD is Back
by Dale Myers
Deputy Administrator of NASA
NASA has, since its inception, welcomed the
opportunity to carry out programs and projects.
Some of these have been technologically and
managerially challenging, and NASA has evolved
management processes to assist in the
documentation and tracking of major program
milestones and resources utilization. As part of
these processes, the Program Approval Document
(PAD) was introduced during the 1960s to record
the authorization of newly approved agency
projects. The document, prepared at a summary
level, outlined the technical plan, number of
launches, project costs and key milestones for
management review. The PAD was intended to be a
contract between the Program Associate
Administrator and the NASA Administrator on the
content, schedule, controls and resources of each
project and was usually updated annually to reflect
major changes. In the early 1970s, the PAD became
an even more powerful document, changing from a
budget orientation to a management one. The
Administrator began to use the PAD to identify
items and milestones he deemed critical to the
orderly progression of the program and to make
such items Administrator-controlled. In other
words, once he and the Program Associate
Administrator agreed to the critical items or
milestones, they could not be changed without the
Administrator's approval.
The use of the PAD as a management document
declined in recent years, and the requirement for
PADs was canceled in 1985. When I assumed the
Deputy Administrator position, l became aware
that there was nothing in the system that
documented program agreements made between
the Administrator and the Program Associate
Administrators. I was very concerned that the
documentation and control which the PAD had
provided the Administrator no longer existed, and I
soon began the process to reinstate the PAD.
First, the new PAD had to be a management
document. It would indeed be the fundamental
contract between the Administrator and Program
Associate Administrator, and it would codify those
critical items that could not be unilaterally
changed.
Second, the PAD would contain significant resource
information and program milestones that would
become part of our monthly program and project
reporting process.
Third, the PAD would be concise. We do not need
additional paper in the system.
Finally, we would apply the PAD requirements
selectively, not blanket all NASA programs and
projects with unnecessary documentation. The
PAD would apply only to those projects the
Administrator deemed necessary.
During the past year we have piloted the
application of the PAD to a number of programs and
will shortly have 20 or so signed PADs. In the very
near future we will publish a NASA Management
Issuance, officially bringing the PAD back. I think
this is a very positive step in the management and
control of our programs and projects, since it
represents the prime objective to be met by the
Associate Administrators in their area of program
management.

Guiding Principles for the Space
Station Program
by James B. Odom
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station
When I came on board in early April 1988, l set
aside time to reflect on the principles that so far
have guided my career and would be applicable to
my new job. I was very comfortable with the
configuration and management organization of the
Space Station Freedom program. In the few years of
its existence, the space station program had
accomplished much, and becoming part of the "next
logical step in space" would be personally
gratifying. However, managing a program that
would spend approximately $20 billion in the next
l0 years would be a real challenge for me. I knew
that the amount and complexity of hardware and
the necessary interfaces were beyond anything I
had worked on, including Apollo, Hubble Space
Telescope, and the Space Shuttle External Tank
programs. I concluded that to pull these thousands
of pieces together and make them fly would demand
strong leadership at all levels, good communication,
and some rather innovative ways to define
accountability, responsibility, and authority.
Any leader can get bogged down in detail and
micromanage a program to death. What I needed
last April were guiding principles, based on lessons
I had learned, to apply to the challenges awaiting
me. I'd like to very briefly share these principles
with you and suggest that, in my experience, better
decisions and actions result from such clearly
defined principles.
1. Mission success is number one. This almost goes
without saying in NASA. It's part and parcel of the
NASA culture. For the Space Station Freedom
program, however, mission success is not merely a
single launch or even the final construction of a
laboratory in space. Rather, Space Station Freedom
will be multi-purpose, international, and
evolutionary. It may be three decades before we can
declare total mission success, and what we do today
will determine tomorrow's successes. Mission
success will be measured by a number of
parameters; among these are crew safety, research
capability, ease of maintainability, economy of
operation and ability to evolve to meet future
national goals.
2. Quality is planned in, designed in, and built in.
Quality is not inspected in. Quality starts before
designs are drawn and well before "metal is bent."
The main message here is that each person and
organization in the program must understand and
believe in the need for quality performance from the
onset of the program. You cannot wait until the
hardware is built to decide you want quality and
then attempt to "inspect" it in. I have often seen
this tried but never successfully or economically.
The Technical Management and Information
Systems tTMIS) will be a significant asset for
collecting and disseminating information on our
quality efforts. Quality encompasses more than just
the delivered hardware. It includes management,
requirements, design, development, testing, and
documentation. Simply stated, the quality of every
person's output is very important to the outcome of
the program.
3. Keep it simple. As engineers we have a tendency
to make systems more complicated than necessary.
Our challenge is especially to make flight systems
simple, thereby increasing reliability, minimizing
training and crew on-orbit support, and reducing
development cost. When we succeed, we get the
added bonus of reducing on-orbit and ground
logistics support costs. The most expensive
component in orbit is the one that is not mandatory
for mission success.
4. Minimize organizational and hardware
interfaces, and maximize clear hardware and
software accountability. An undisputed fact of
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NASA culture is that our strength resides in our
field centers. On the surface it may appear that a
single management team would be preferable to the
three management levels currently in place.
However, many of NASA's past successes have had
multiple field center involvement. Each
participating field center brings much added value
to the program by the center management review
process and the personnel and facilities which could
not be duplicated at any single NASA installation
or prime contractor's facility. We have established
a clear requirements chain-of-accountability by
having the appropriate requirements derived,
controlled, and accounted for at the appropriate
management level, In doing this we have placed
the top level program responsibilities at
Headquarters (Level I and II) and taken maximum
advantage of the field centers' management and
engineering expertise in design, development,
manufacturing, and operations. Now, to further
ensure that the program is fully integrated at the
field centers and prime contractors, we have
implemented an associate contractor role among
the four major work package contractors. This
means that the contractors share much more
responsibility in the design and functioning of
"components" and "boxes" that are delivered from
one contractor to another. This was done to
mitigate the thousands of pieces of government-
furnished equipment identified for delivery
between the work package contractors. Simply
stated, the receiving contractor and the delivery
contractor are jointly responsible for the item until
the item is fit or functionally demonstrated in the
next level of assembly. This is true for both
hardware and software. This is the first time NASA
has utilized an associate contractor role to this
degree.
Another extremely important element initiated
very early in the program is the Software Support
Environments (SSE). The SSE will establish a
program-wide set of rules and tools for software
architecture and production. The SSE is mandatory
for a highly software-driven program such as ours.
I believe the SSE will be a model for large, complex
programs of the future.
With the above plans in place, program
requirements can be established and managed, and
the proper accountability can be identified.
5. Maximize Margins. Margins of safety, cost,
schedule, quality assurance, and the like must be
maximized to the greatest extent feasible. The real
costs and dangers come when things don't fit or
work as they should. Add-ons or corrections after
the hardware and software are developed are major
cost drivers, time wasters, and sources of future
problems. The best time to effectively manage
resources is early in the program in order to ensure
maximum safety, reliability, maintainability, and
quality assurance in hardware and software. To
over-subscribe such valuable resources as weight,
power, volume and crew time early in the design
without the ability for later add-ons will
significantly complicate the job.
The long life of this program brings with it the
necessity to intelligently provide the "hooks and
scars" for future growth and subsystems upgrading.
This is one of the most complex tasks facing us, and
one of the most important.
6. Maximize redundancy. But also manage it. The
space station program has built triple redundancy
into critical systems. To extend redundancy further
would make the system less manageable. Once
backup systems are in place, you have to "manage "
them to know you will be able to depend upon
second and third levels of redundancy when called
upon.
7. Automation, robotics and Artificial Intelligence
capability not built in will be accommodated by
hooks and scars. We can build the Freedom station
with today's technology. We need to push hard on
automation systems, robotics and expert systems,
but not too hard. We plan in the future to
incorporate new technologies, thus reducing long-
term operations costs. On the other hand, Freedom
can, through the use of hooks and scars, be designed
to accommodate breakthroughs, and we are
committed to incorporating such advances as they
become available.
8. Authority will be delegated to the lowest level
practical and commensurate with the demonstrated
real accountability. Unnecessary layers of
bureaucracy take too much time to unravel. People
take real pride in their work when they are given
the tools and resources commensurate with the job--
and the ultimate accountability for its success.
Finding the right mix of accountability,
responsibility and authority is no easy task, but
emphasizing the necessity to do so to each program
and project manager is mandatory. The
management structure clearly identifies the
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management levels and their accountabilities. If
the accountability is not accepted, that portion of
the program will be relocated.
9. Life-cycle cost will always be a key decision
driver starting with development cost. The space
station program spent much time and money in
early definition work to identify and establish
detailed designs that meet user requirements and
life-cycle cost objectives within total and annual
budgets. We know where we're going and what it
will take to get there. We are saving a lot of time
and money by preparing detailed plans, and
listening to the good advice of potential users. An
extensive cost model is being put in place to price all
major program decisions that have an impact on
development and operations. Close attention to
detail in the development phase will save enormous
amounts of time and money in the operational
phase.
10. Space Station Freedom is not an end product
but a key element of NASA and our nation's future.
This principle could be considered a subset of
number 9 above. | have identified it separately to
give it the emphasis it deserves. In the early days it
is easy for an organization to be buried up to its
elbows in day-to-day problems, and equally easy to
focus on the near-term solution that compromises
future operational costs and performance.
Space Station Freedom will likely be our nation's
gateway to planetary exploration, lunar bases, or
missions to planet Earth. Therefore, we cannot
over-emphasize the need for attention to growth
capability or economic operability.
11. The international elements are vital to Space
Station Freedom's success. For many years the
United States and our international partners have
successfully conducted complex joint space
programs, and [ am sure that this cooperation will
continue and expand in the years to come.
Freedom, however, will be the largest, most difficult
and complex international cooperative space
venture to date. Our international partners are
contributing approximately 30% of the program
development cost and will make a similar
investment in the operational cost. They are
significant members of the team.
There will be complications, of course. The
interleaving of sub-systems, crew roles, training,
and a very distributed science and station ground
operational system are some that come to mind. We
have dealt with similar problems before, and
learning to do this effectively may be one of the best
avenues for cooperation in many future peaceful
initiatives.
12. Space Station Program Levels I and II manage
the program; Level lII and the prime contractors
..design, develop and fabricate Space Station
Freedom. This principle was explicitly added to
reinforce the fact that Levels I and II are
management overview functions, and design and
development responsibility rests with the Level IlI
centers and their contractors.
13. Space Station Freedom Requirements. Space
Station Freedom requirements are developed and
managed by Levels I and II and satisfied and
verified by Level III (a subset of number 12 above).
14. The Technical Management and Information
Sys.tem (TMIS) will be the key management tool,
and the sooner the better. A program as large as
this, as distributed as this, interleaved as this,
requires an information system to gather, sort,
compile, display, and disseminate current and
accurate information. This includes requirements,
design drawings, test, quality, and schedule and
cost data, to name a few. Automated systems and
software exist or can be built to perform this
function in a highly automated mode. When you
put them all together they are called TMIS. TMIS
will allow the entire program to operate using
timely and consistent information, with minimum
input and retrieval effort. The extreme
interdependence of each work package on at least
one other work package requires current
development status to be available across the
program at a much lower level of detail than
frequently required. TMIS will make this possible.
Without this system in place, I do not believe it
would be possible to maintain a proper program
balance.
15. Every person in the Space Station Freedom
organization must think and perform as a systems
engineer or manager. This principle is most
important but very difficult to implement. I cannot
direct or legislate this to happen. I can, however,
encourage our people to adopt this mindset. Most of
NASA's large programs in the past consisted of
major elements such as launch vehicle stages or
spacecraft buses that accommodated a series of
experiments delivered to an integrating contractor
or center for assembly and check-out. In other
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words, there were easily identified and defined
interfaces. This program has anything but clean
hardware/subsystem and management interfaces.
Virtually all decisions made at the component and
black box level can potentially affect another
system component design or the attendant station
operation. Significant changes can be controlled by
the Interface Control Document and Architecture
Control Document systems. However, lower level
changes are not controlled in this way. These
changes require the engineer and manager to think
and function as a systems engineer and to question
the real effect each minor change has on other
elements of the program. This process is counter to
the natural inclination to get the hardware
delivered on cost and schedule. The need for this
"system level" consciousness is present in this
program more than in any previous NASA
program. This management and engineering
discipline will be even more necessary as this
program continues to develop.
Here then are my guiding principles for the
management of Space Station Freedom. It would be
difficult if not impossible to codify any or all of these
principles into hard, fixed policy. But I think we
can benefit from knowing what and how a manager
thinks and what is expected. It is part of the
communication process.
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Project Management: JSC's Heritage and Challenge
by Aaron Cohen
Director, Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
Introduction
Project management is one of the most trying jobs
anyone can have, but it's also one of the most
gratifying. As the director of the Johnson Space
Center, I'm involved in project management
decisions concerning the Space Shuttle and the
fledgling Space SLation Freedom every day. Earlier,
I had the marvelous opportunity to manage two of
the most challenging projects of my career --
development of the Apollo Command and Service
Modules and the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
Now it's my duty to pass along some of the things I've
learned about project management over the years:
"Hands-on" experience is a prerequisite to
effectively, efficiently dealing with the three
classical elements of project management --
performance, cost and schedule.
Performance is not everything -- cost and
schedule are very important. Schedule drives
cost, and cost drives what you can produce. Don't
ever let anyone tell you otherwise.
Patience, communication, honesty and treating
people fairly are necessary elements of project
management. You must be people oriented.
Contract management and project control are as
important to project management as technical
expertise.
• You must do more than make decisions. You
must make timely decisions.
• Compromise is acceptable and is an important
component of success.
• Better is the enemy of the good. You can never
solve all of the problems.
Before I go into detail about each of these lessons,
though, I'd like to establish a common foundation of
understanding on which we can build.
How Does JSC Use Project Manage-
ment?
JSC's organization is designed to produce solutions --
through project management -- to the technical
problems that stand in the way of safe, productive
manned spaceflights.
A project is a single, nonrepetitive, organized
enterprise undertaken to achieve an objective within
a specified time and cost. Project management is the
business of creating -- through a sensible sequence of
efforts that utilize to best advantage the resources
available -- a product that achieves the objective. A
program is a series or group of projects that achieve a
broader goal within an overall time limit and budget.
Our product at Johnson Space Center is to carry out
agency objectives when they involve putting men and
women into space, keeping them alive and productive
while they're there and returning them safely to
Earth. We design, develop and operate manned
spacecraft and train the crews that use them. We
conduct scientific research and medical experiments
that help us understand how space affects both
astronauts and spacecraft.
Working in concert with other NASA Centers and
private industry, we manage projects and contribute
to programs for America to survive, learn and
expand. The goals our programs are designed to
achieve include, but are not limited to, engendering
national and international esteem, furthering
scientificresearch,bolsteringourcountry'seconomy
andstrengtheningournationaldefense.
The JSC workforce must be able to solve very
difficult andcomplextechnicalproblemsto achieve
theseambitiousprogramgoals.Theyaresupported
by an organization and management process
uniquelysuitedtothechallenge.
JSC's Environment and Culture
JSC nurtures an environment and culture that
motivate our people to strive for technical excellence
above all else. The environment and culture also
encourage open, effective communication at all levels
on the premise that no surprise is a good surprise
when it comes to human-rated systems.
These motivations tend to make us downplay rank
authority at JSC and to encourage a "smart buyer"
philosophy in the management of our contracts with
private industry.
The de-emphasis of formal hierarchy at JSC has its
roots in the peer review system that dominated
decisions within NASA's predecessor organization,
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA). The fact that JSC's original contingent was
a "melting pot" of civil service engineers and
scientists, industry experts and military and former
military specialists contributed to an organizational
structure and management process that was tolerant
of dissent. These cultural characteristics encouraged
a team concept at JSC that allowed each team
member to feel free to present his or her point. The
emphasis was and still is on technical excellence and
awareness, not on toeing the hierarchical line.
This type of communication helps ensure that project
managers are aware of all available facts, both those
that pertain to the progress of each project and those
that concern potential obstacles, because there is still
one person who ultimately must make the decisions
and be held responsible for them. Like the
controlling stockholder in a large company, the
project manager always has 51 percent of the vote.
JSC's management process also provides for the best
contributions from private industry and government
(both civilian and military) personnel in decision
making. This highly interactive style produces
excellent technical decisions, but sometimes makes it
a challenge to distinguish between public and private
employees. Some people criticize NASA for being too
close to its contractors. But we are dealing with an
extremely hostile environment in space, an
environment that does not suffer mistakes
graciously. Strong teamwork is required to produce
the consistently high-quality equipment and
procedures that allow humans to survive and work
productively in space. That kind of teamwork cannot
be generated in an adversarial environment on
Earth.
We manage well because we have technical as well as
academic experience. Government scientists and
engineers can get hands-on experience in JSC's
laboratories so as to manage projects from an
educated and experiential perspective. Their hands-
on research and development establish an
understanding of what the various spacecraft
systems can and should do, how much they should
cost and how soon they can be ready for delivery.
Beneath this interactive management process,
however, are differences in the way people view their
jobs. Engineering, safety, reliability and quality
assurance and science organizations are common at
most other Centers. At JSC, the flight crew, mission
and ground operations perspectives add a new
dimension to project management. The project office
is responsible for listening to concerns and
suggestions from these organizations and, with the
help of the contractor, arriving at meaningful
solutions.
Decision making, furthermore, hinges often on some
concerns outside of JSC. Since most manned vehicles
carry payloads, the project office must also consider
the advice from other NASA Centers and agencies
that have prime responsibility for those payloads.
External influences--such as the cultural differences
between NASA's manned spaceflight Centers and
research Centers, the increasingly divided
management responsibility for manned spaceflight
programs, the different styles of project management
among the manned spaceflight Centers, and the
increasingly demanding oversight of external
authorities--also have marked effects on the
programs and projects in which JSC is involved.
Therefore, project management at JSC must balance
the three classical elements of cost, schedule and
performance and face the challenge of balancing the
pressures caused by these diverse internal and
external influences as well.
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IEvolution of a Matrix
On paper, JSC is separated into line organizations
that perform operations, engineering, and science.
Separate from these line organizations are other
organizations that perform support functions such as
contracts; personnel; safety, reliability and quality
assurance; legal; Center operations; flight crew
operations; and public affairs. All ten organizations
report to the Center director•
Project management organizations must integrate
the products of all of these organizations, coordinate
their efforts and manage the hardware and support
contracts as they relate to each project• They, too,
report to the Center director, but they are "more
equal" than the other organizations, and they also
must be responsive to the program directors at NASA
Headquarters.
Together, these separate and distinct organizations
intertwine to form a matrix organizational structure
designed to support the effective management of
JSC's project and initiative offices. To a limited
extent, the program and project offices must compete
for the resources provided by the line organizations.
The line organizations must balance the needs of the
project offices with the limited resources available
and do their best to support all JSC program and
project offices effectively. Decisions are made after
consulting me and senior management staff from
each functional directorate. This provides a check
and balance for JSC project management decisions
and the wise distribution of resources to each project•
While JSC has utilized a matrix organization since
its formation in 1961, the alignment of that matrix
has changed. As with any organization, what shows
up on paper is only the tip of the iceberg. JSC's
environment, culture, motivations and experiences
all play a major role in determining how the
organizational matrix acts and reacts. JSC's
environment and culture support two overarching
motivations -- technical excellence and no surprises.
Manned spaceflight will always contain an element
of risk. JSC's organizational experiences have
included both successes and failures, and crisis has
been a catalyst for change, as it has been in other
organizations, both public and private.
I joined the Manned Spacecraft Center in 1962 as
part of the industry contingent entering the Center's
melting pot. We were managing the Mercury,
Gemini and Apollo programs at the same time we
were building the Manned Spacecraft Center. In
those days, only the separate project offices and
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directorates reported directly to Center Director
Robert Gilruth. All of the organizations reported to
the Center director when developing the support
functions, but many of the Apollo decisions were
made exclusively by the Apollo Spacecraft Program
Office. Since the Center really was working on only
one program, Apollo _Mercury and Gemini were
basically stepping stones for the lunar landing
program), JSe's organizational structure became a
"vertical matrix" with most of its activities
supporting that program.
The Apollo 204 pad fire that claimed the lives of
astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger
Chaffee in 1967 represented an organizational crisis.
It became obvious that the "vertical matrix" allowed
the program office too much autonomy. Dr. George
Low, who was also JSC deputy director, became
program manager and brought a broader perspective
and management style to the job. He required the
participation of all ,ISC line organizations to a
greater extent than had been the case before the
Apollo fire. He expanded the Center's management
process to include all of JSC's senior functional
managers in major Apollo Program decisions. JSC's
director and his senior staff were assigned a check
and balance responsibility for the program. What
had been a limited communication process between
the program manager and each of the JSC
organizational elements became more open, and the
entire Center senior staff was encouraged through a
more participative management style to help make
the decisions of the program.
A separate safety, reliability and quality assurance
organization also was established. The Center
director began to oversee all decisions, whether they
involved project management, operations,
engineering, science or support. JSC's
organizational structure has changed little since that
time.
A Different Emphasis
I was project manager for the Apollo Command and
Service Modules (CSM) from 1968 to 1972, and for
the Space Transportation System Orbiter from 1972
to 1982. Throughout both projects, one of my
principal responsibilities was to constantly make
trades between performance, schedule and cost.
Today's project managers are making similar trades.
While the need to make these trades is a constant
characteristic of project management, the priority
each assumes in relation to the other can change
drastically. These priorities are driven by both
internal and external forces that establish a goal, a
mission and a management philosophy for each
program. They are rarely black and white. More
often than not, such priorities are shades of gray that
lighten and darken on a ease-by-case basis using the
best information available at the time.
As I managed the CSM project, the priorities that
normally held were performance first, schedule
second and cost third. Our first challenge was to
achieve the goal -- to build the Apollo spacecraft,
train the crews and fly the missions that would
accomplish the material goal of putting men on the
surface of the Moon and returning them safely to
Earth. Our second most pressing challenge was to do
it on the schedule stipulated by President Kennedy.
The element that received the least overall emphasis
was cost.
At the height of the Apollo Program, nearly 4 percent
of the national budget went to NASA. By contrast,
NASA now receives less than l percent of the
national budget to fund the Space Shuttle and space
station programs. During Apollo, there were no
starts and stops on the production lines. As we built
the Space Shuttle Orbiter, we repeatedly had to
assess which subsystems could wait to be produced
and which could not because of variations in
budgetary commitments to the space program.
The Space Shuttle program was conceived as a more
cost-effective means of providing access to space and
a necessary way of providing transportation to and
from a future permanently manned space station.
For a manned space station to remain operational for
long periods, it would need continued resupply and
crew exchanges. A vehicle was needed to carry
people and cargo into orbit, return both safely to
Earth and do it over and over again -- all on a tight
budget. The goal had changed from reaching a
destination to developing a transportation capability.
The order of priorities that normally held for the
Space Shuttle Orbiter was performance first, cost
second and schedule third. NASA was still required
to achieve the desired level of performance, but
because of budgetary constraints, cost requirements
had to take precedence over schedule achievements
in the early stages of the shuttle program.
I am not going to say that one program was easier to
manage than the other, but the facts are that the
programs of the 1970s placed a much greater
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emphasis on cost than the programs of the 1960s.
This was not all bad because it forced us to pay closer
attention to cost-effective technical solutions, and to
keep in mind the goal of providing a less expensive
means of access to space. And I don't mean to infer
that safety and reliability can be sacrificed. As I
mentioned earlier, performance was always the
number one consideration. You can still obtain a
successful product in terms of performance, cost and
schedule, but when cost takes precedence over
schedule, the ability to make the right decision the
first time becomes more important. More
productivity and innovation are needed to solve
problems of equal or greater complexity with less
money. This placed an added demand on the project
managers because they were required to instill
resource management discipline in technical
organizations that were not used to giving so much
attention to resource allocation.
The Apollo vehicle was not as technically
complicated as the Shuttle Orbiter. However, the
Apollo mission was much more complicated than the
Shuttle's mission. During the Apollo program there
was the luxury of solving problems by using multiple
paths, due to resource availability. During the
Shuttle program, budget constraints forced us to
choose from among possible paths early and follow
the one that looked the most promising.
Avoiding Pitfalls
Whatever priorities are dictated by the environment,
a project manager can never equally satisfy all
elements of project management. There is no exact
project management formula or equation for making
performance-cost-schedule trades. But the lessons I
have learned from people like Robert Gilruth, Max
Faget, Chris Kraft and George Low -- and from my
own experience -- tell me that there are several
important principles in maximizing the probability
of success. Those factors sometimes contradict one
another and they must be applied on a case-by-case
basis, but they are nonetheless valuable.
APOLLO PTV-1 ACTIVITY -- View of the Apollo Spacecraft PTV-1 inside Chamber A, Space
Environment Simulation Laboratory, Manned Spacecraft Center, prior to manned thermal-
vacuum testing.
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First, you must fearlessly base your decisions on the
best information available. As a project manager you
will have many different considerations with regard
to each programmatic issue. Simply by making a
decision, you ensure that you probably will be right
more than half the time.
Many times during the life of a project, a project
manager will be faced with decisions that need to be
made in a timely fashion, and either all the data is
not available or it will not become available in time.
In other words, the time and effort spent in trying to
obtain additional information may not be
worthwhile. A specific example of this occurred
during the early design phase of the Orbiter. The
avionics system was being formulated and a
microwave scanning beam landing system (MSBLS)
was being considered as a navigation aid. At the
time, the MSBLS was pushing the state-of-the-art.
The question before me: Should I use current, proven
technology or should I try to push the state of the art
and wait for such an advancement in the technology?
I based my decision to push for the new technology on
the data I had and the desire of my team to use the
system. We made a decision, and it proved to be
correct.
Second, you must make decisions in a timely manner.
If you are decisive early and are wrong, you can still
correct your error. During the Orbiter design,
development, test and evaluation phase, I was forced
to make many trades in terms of performance, cost
and schedule. On one particular occasion, I was
reviewing thermal system structural test
requirements that contained a number of articles
such as parts of wings, parts of the mid and forward
fuselage and their thermal protection systems. The
technical team needed to test all of the articles, but
they were too large to test all at once, and I had a
limited budget. After spending a full Saturday in
review of all the test articles, I eliminated several
despite the extreme concern of several of the
technical experts I had supporting me. Weeks later
they came back and argued their point of concern
again. This time, their point struck home and I
reversed myself and put the test articles back into
the program. By making a timely decision, I had
given myselfa chance to correct a potential error.
degradation and still perform the mission. The
questions before management: Do we understand the
reason for the gyro drift, and could this lead to a
greater degradation and threaten the success of the
mission? Changing an IMU out of the lunar module
on the pad was not an easy task, and we would be
risking major damage to the fragile structure of the
lunar module if one of the heavy instruments were
dropped during a pad change-out. A group of us
discussed this problem with George Low, then Apollo
program manager. We strongly recommended to him
that we should not change out the IMU. His
comment was: "If you can fix a problem by making a
timely decision, do it." We replaced the IMU.
Fourth, always remember that better is the enemy of
the good. You can never solve all of the problems. If
you have obtained an acceptable level of system
performance, any "improvements" run the risk of
becoming detriments. Right now, we are struggling
with this very situation as we try to improve the
design of the solid rocket motors and add emergency
egress systems to the Orbiter. Each improvement
brings with it a price in terms of weight. Each
additional pound reduces the margin we have in the
amount of thrust available to reach orbit. We have
had to ask ourselves, "At what point do these new
safety features become liabilities?"
Fifth, don't forget how important good business and
contract management are to the successful operation
of a contract. Project managers must realize that
when they manage a contract they should do their
best to be fair to both the government and the
contractor. In order to do this, they need strong
project controls on budget, schedule and
configuration. The project manager must be sure the
changes that are made are negotiated promptly and
equitably for the government and contractor.
Fairness in dealing with the contractor is the most
productive way to do business. You want to penalize
when appropriate, but you also want to reward when
appropriate. To establish what is appropriate, you
must set the ground rules early. The first signs of
project management failure are budget overruns and
schedule slips. This can be understood and
potentially avoided or minimized by good project
control and contract management.
Third, if you can fix a problem by making a decision,
do it. During the checkout of Apollo ll, the Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) of the lunar module was
slightly out of specifications in gyro drift. The
analysis showed that you could accept a little more
Last, and most important, you must be people
oriented. It is through people that projects get done.
Dealing with people is extremely difficult for many
project managers who have an engineering
background and are more comfortable working with
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an algorithm than explaining how to use one. Good
project managers surround themselves with talented
people who will speak up when they believe they are
right. They make themselves available to their
bosses and to the people who support them. They
listen when people express their concerns and make
people want to express their concerns by explaining
decisions that contradict the advice they've been
given. They accept criticism without being defensive
and are able to reverse their decisions when they are
wrong.
One of the most vivid and memorable experiences
I've had in this regard happened during the
preparation for Apollo 8 in early December 1968.
The preparations had been going very smoothly
without any big issues needing to be worked for
several weeks. Then it happened. About two weeks
before the flight ! was told by the contractor, North
American Aviation, and JSC propulsion subsystem
managers that we had a potentially serious problem
with the service propulsion system (SPS). We had
just finished some tests in the configuration that we
were going to use for lunar orbit insertion.
Apollo 8 was going to place the CSM on a free-return
trajectory, which meant that if we did not perform an
SPS burn behind the Moon the spacecraft would
automatically return to Earth. The SPS fuel injector
was fed by a pair of redundant systems. We wanted
both of them to be active during the lunar orbit
insertion burn so that if one feeder line
malfunctioned, the other would get propellant to the
SPS. The tests we had just finished were in this
configuration, but it was the first time they had been
used and both lines had been dry before the test. The
tests showed that if we started the burn with both
lines dry, a pressure spike occurred that could cause
a catastrophic failure in the SPS. If both lines were
wetted, however, the pressure spike would not occur.
! got very upset when I was told this, but the test
engineers stood their ground. They told me very
firmly that the problem had to be addressed, and they
presented a good solution. By firing the SPS on a
single system out-of-plane burn during translunar
coast -- which would not disturb the free-return
trajectory -- we would have both systems wetted by
the time we needed to use them together and, hence,
avert the high-pressure spike.
Now it was my job to call my boss and let him know
what I knew and how to fix the problem. I had no
qualms about doing this because my boss, George
Low, had taught me several important things by his
actions and words: get out and touch the real
hardware; pay attention to detail; when things go
wrong, look for innovations, the unusual solutions, or
try to meet your commitment no matter what; and
have great respect for your fellow human beings.
Management Toolbox
The surgeon has a scalpel, the general has a battle
plan and the project manager has still another
arsenal of tools. The adept and effective use of these
tools is a critical factor in the success of the project
manager. Because almost 90 cents of every dollar
budgeted for NASA is spent by a NASA contractor,
these tools are used to assist the project manager in
the contract management responsibilities.
The basic project management tool is the contract. A
contract baseline is established through the
development of a statement of work, a segmentation
of the work by use of a work breakdown structure
once a contract baseline has been negotiated between
the contractor and the Government. Then the project
manager must maintain a continuing awareness of
the status of the project. The tools of the project
manager at this stage include management
reviews where technical and business staff conduct
in-depth assessments of the project with counterparts
from industry.
The project manager must delegate a portion of the
responsibility to the matrix organization structured
to support the project. The backbone of this matrix
assignment is a three-party team composed of
subsystem management, project control, and the
contracting officer.
The best management tools are the ones that allow
communication to flow in the most efficient manner.
By efficient, I mean the presentation of a large
amount of data in a small amount of time in a format
that allows decisions to be made. I have primarily
discussed the matrix management systems that JSC
used during the Apollo and Shuttle programs and the
term "subsystem manager."
Every day from noon to 1 p.m., I had a "stand-up"
briefing in a control room on various subsystems
and other aspects of the Orbiter project. We held
these meetings in a room that had been structured
with schedule control boards mounted on the
walls. These boards served as our controlling display
of the total project. A particular project individual
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was assigned to maintain current project status on
each control board. This allowed a great deal of data
to be transmitted in a very efficient manner. Issues
were laid out for discussion and I then could schedule
decision-making meetings. This proved to be a very
efficient way in which to do business.
The next level of review that was created was a
weekly or an "as needed" Technical Status Review
meeting. The purpose of this review was to have a
combined JSC technical and contractor review by
teleconference.
One of the most critical project management tools
that works in conjunction with the project manager's
use of the contract and management review concept
is the change control process. | used the change
control process as a way to maintain a disciplined
and detailed accounting of my contract baseline. At
the heart of the change control process is the Change
Control Board. The Change Control Board was a
weekly meeting of JSC directorates and the
contractor to make formal decisions on proposed
changes.
The management tool used to ensure that the prime
contractor was carrying out the contractual
responsibilities in the most effective and efficient
manner possible was the monthly Orbiter
Management Review (OMR). The OMR was held
at the contractor's facility and reviewed the total
project. This review normally took two days. It was a
review of the financial, contractual and technical
status of the project.
These sessions at the contractor's facility enabled me
to conduct an in-depth review of the status of the
contractor's work in the same manner that I had been
able to review the government teams' work in my
daily noon meetings.
Another project management tool that aided the
communication within JSC and from JSC to our
contractor was the Award Fee process. The
opportunity to identify for the contractor specific
areas of project emphasis and to couple this emphasis
with the awarding of a contractor fee based upon
accomplishment of specific project objectives served
as a very powerful management tool. ! use a
performance measurement system to help me
objectively evaluate how accurately the contractors
achieve their targets.
Conclusion
Project management is the heart of NASA's success.
NASA in its relatively short lifetime has made some
spectacular manned spaceflight accomplishments.
Landing a man on the Moon and returning him
safely to Earth, linking a manned U.S. spacecraft
with a Soviet craft, launching and operating a
manned space station, Skylab, for several months,
and developing and operating the Space
Transportation System--all have claimed the
attention of a world that is inspired and challenged
by technological advancement. Add to these all the
unmanned probes of the universe, mapping of our
solar system, fly-bys of orbital planets and the
scientific advances in earth-sensing and aeronautics
and you conclude that America has been well served
by NASA.
JSC's product has been the formulation,
management and execution of projects that put men,
women and unmanned craft into space and allow
them to do useful scientific research and work. All of
these NASA endeavors are accomplishable because
of NASA's utilization of project management. But
there are several characteristics of the NASA
utilization of project management techniques that
are somewhat unique and thereby have served as an
inspiration not only to the United States but to the
free world.
For the most part, NASA projects have had a clear
statement of their goal or purpose, such as to land a
man on the Moon and return him safely to Earth.
Second, NASA projects have had a precise schedule
for achievement of these goals. Third, NASA projects
have been open for the world to observe. Because
part of NASA's charter is to disseminate information
about aeronautics and spaceflight, the whole world
has been a spectator for our daily project
accomplishments and failures. Fourth, at NASA we
do more than produce and deliver "widgets" as many
businesses do. We develop and build widgets as part
of our work, but we build them to help us achieve our
mission objectives. The world follows the successes
and failures of our widgets in both their development
and their use.
These characteristics have placed very great
demands on the NASA project managers. The
intensity of these demands has required an
uncommon attention by NASA project managers to
an openness and clarity of communication, a
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dedication to the project task and uncanny, almost
single-minded, attention to detail.
As acute as these demands have been and as well as
we have responded, I can guarantee that we will have
to redouble our efforts in the future. The complexity
of our projects will increase. The cost constraints will
continue, and probably tighten. We will have to
manage multiple programs, and make them work
together as in the case of the Space Station Freedom
and the Shuttle. We will be managing programs
with lengthening or never-ending lifespans.
International participation will increase and
intensify. NASA's Centers and support contractors
will work even more closely. We'll begin working
with more private sector commercial ventures.
How we react to these intensified and diversified
demands is the key to our future. Our reactions
should be driven by the lessons we've learned, but we
must move beyond those basics. Our project
management capabilities must evolve in directions
that have not yet been defined. We must carefully
evaluate every adjustment and improvement we
make to our program management methods, just as
we evaluate every change in a spacecraft's systems to
be sure that the change is beneficial and that the
repercussions of any side effects are not detrimental.
I am confident we can meet the challenges today and
in our future through the judicious use and continued
refinement of our project management techniques.
There is no simple formula for the success of project
management, but the rewards of a job well done and
witnessed by the whole world are well worth the
effort.
Back on April 12, 1981, just a few seconds past 6 a.m., Space Shuttle Columbia rises off Pad 39A at the
Kennedy Space Center, marking the launch of the Shuttle Era in manned spaceflight. STS-1 carried
Commander John W. Young and Pilot Robert L. Crippen toward an Earth.orbital mission which represented
the start of a new era in space transportation for NASA and the world.
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II I
Shared Experience in NASA Projects
Some Tips and Observations
Wallops Island, Virginia
August 25, 1987
by A. Guastaferro
Vice President, Space Station Program
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
It has been a real opportunity to serve in all but the
first five of the 30 years of U.S. spaceflight. For
program and project managers, these three decades
have been filled with enormous challenge and
exciting opportunities, mainly because there have
been no clear precedents for managers. In those
early years, we had to progress incrementally, if you
wish. Each step along the way, NASA and industry
expanded the knowledge base and technological
capabilities to a point where each individual project
became incrementally more complicated, expensive
and challenging. Management of these projects--
from the small unmanned payloads to the medium-
sized Mercury-Gemini to the larger payloads of the
Apollo-Skylab era--likewise presented new
challenges and demands. The old ways of doing
things simply did not work in this new complex and
high-tech environment.
Nor will they work in the current phase of spaceflight
development, with multiple payloads in the Shuttle
era. New tools, new techniques are required as
NASA and industry enter the long-term aspects of
space station design, development and operations.
Yet, we all look back with pride to spaceflight
programs of the past that worked efficiently. We
respect the management tools that led to mission
success in earlier projects. As we look toward the
management challenges of spaceflight development
of the 1990s, we must reflect on the accomplishments
and failures of the past and apply the [essons learned
in a constructive way. The NASA project manager
represents the leadership of the U.S. in space
exploration. It is critical that the NASA project
manager learn from the past to build a space
program second to none.
In other words, there are some things worth saving,
others to discard and still more to build upon. When
you add up all the marvelous advances and successful
missions of the past 30 years of U.S. spaceflight, you
can't help but think that the partnership between
NASA and industry has become one of the more
remarkable management feats of all time. The
synergy and cross-fertilization of this partnership are
worth exploring.
My purpose here is to provide a perspective of both
NASA and industrial project management issues as
they relate to research and development activities.
NASA project managers represent the leadership of
an organization. As such they have accepted a
responsibility--better stated, an accountability--for
the total aspect of a particular task. They must
accept cost and schedule responsibility, along with
the technical aspects of the assignment. A good
manager views this assignment as if it were a
personal business and tries to determine
effectiveness by some predetermined measurement
system. Following are observations on project
management issues from both NASA and industry
points of view.
First of all, the initial formulation of a NASA project
is extremely critical to mission success. The
advocacy phase must be carried out with very careful
planning, timely marketing and with a clear
understanding of the organization's mission and
available resources. On the government side, the
establishment of an approved project may take years.
Early in the advocacy process, a strongly supportive
outside constituency is needed, to help secure a
budget line item for the next fiscal year. This
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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constituency should include several aerospace
contractors willing to direct their new business
resources toward the project in return for an
opportunity to compete in the design and formulation
phase.
The industry formulation process is not very
different. Contractors have limited resources and a
large spectrum of opportunities. The successful
contractor gets involved early, assigns qualified
people, provides adequate resources and maintains a
strong relationship with NASA so that critical
resources are focused to the project objectives.
Contractors are available to help NASA in the
selling of the project during the formulation period.
Accountability
In accepting accountability for an organization unit,
make sure you understand its objectives. In addition,
find out what inter-organizational relationships are
required and where your resources and constraints
will come from. Understand what is expected of your
unit. Get a contract between you and your boss, you
and center management, you and headquarters, you
and your family. If internal and external forces are
going to influence the performance of your unit, get a
commitment to:
• Cost
• Schedule
• Technical performance
• Risk
Make sure you are given sufficient authority to carry
out your task. Don't put yourself in a "no-win"
position at the outset. Get an understanding--and
then the commitment. A successful business always
does.
When I look back on my NASA years, it strikes me
that the government system ordinarily does not
provide a natural environment for full
accountability. The typical organizational structures
and the non-profit environment are impediments to
accountability. On the other hand, the industrial
R&D managers assume fiscal responsibilities very
early in their career and are better prepared for
project management responsibilities. Perhaps NASA
managers should develop their own methods outside
of the organizational system to provide the stimulus
for accountable management. Essentially, the skill
is there--but the environment is not.
Establish a Standard
After receiving a clear understanding of the
management assignment and the resources and
schedule constraints, make sure you develop
specification, a standard of performance. Make your
specification realistic and flexible. (Many a manager
has died of hardening of the categories.) Divide your
work into a logical structure. Avoid false
competition, unnecessary overlap, or gaps. Find the
right person for the right job. Delegate a portion of
your contract to your subordinates and depend on
them.
I believe that the discipline and the environment of
NASA encourage individual performance in the
development of hardware/software capabilities.
Industry, driven by the profit motive, will find ways
to meet performance requirements that avoid strict
adherence to rules and regulations. NASA is
experienced in setting standards but not compliance
to them. Simply stated, it is easier to write the rules
than to follow them. I believe that a healthy
exchange of technical experience can benefit both
parties.
Make a Plan
Establish an integrated plan. Assign accountability
for accomplishment. Make sure you understand the
critical elements and provide sufficient schedule
margin for "work-arounds." Review performance
versus plan, frequently. Detailed schedules should
be realistic. (Be careful--do not become overly
optimistic.) I believe in pressure scheduling only to
meet a crisis. Crisis or stress management in a
research environment should be the exception and
not the rule. Schedules and plans should be highly
visible.
There seems to be very little difference between
planning in NASA and the aerospace industry. Both
organizations are highly tuned and efficient in the
aspects of integrated planning, and both have
developed performance measurements systems
significantly useful to the decision-making process. I
cannot find any difference in technique, process, or
effectiveness. Perhaps we have trained each other to
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be consistently good and bad in the areas of planning,
review and analysis.
Communications
A good manager is a good communicator. You should
develop a motto of "no surprises."
frequently. A few ideas:
$
$
Communicate
Weekly staff meetings
Management by walking around
Electronic management information systems
Teleconferences with contractors and grantees
Thorough requirement and design reviews
Frequent status reviews
Outside reviews
Visits to outside work activities (and show
interest)
Finding a way to involve your boss
An open-door policy for your people
Curiosity (ask questions)
In my short time in industry, I have been impressed
that industry is far more bureaucratic than NASA in
its communication methods. For instance, customer
briefings are critiqued to a far greater extent than I
experienced at NASA. It is apparent that the success
of the project and, in turn, the company, are critically
assessed. NASA's approach is to assume a degree of
confidence in the program and competence in its
people. It is an attitude that I appreciated and
somewhat miss.
Contract Management
The easiest way to improve contract performance is
to concentrate on the selection process. Make sure
your contractor has the experience and personnel to
carry out the technical aspects of the contract.
Remember, a bad marriage between the government
and contractor will always lead to a costly divorce
settlement for the government. Some thoughts to
keep in mind:
• Guard against expansionofrequirements
• Expect the unexpected technical problems
• Temper optimism regarding schedule and cost
• Watch for engineering changes that make things
better instead of make them work
• Expect an underscoping of the project control
function
[n industry, the contracting relationship is normally
between two aerospace contractors. There is far less
formality in this type of a relationship and, as a
result, a lot more difficulty in full compliance and
implementation. Although I have found the NASA
procurement process to be stifling, it has benefits in
long term implementation and compliance.
Getting Your Vote Canceled
One barrier to effective communications is the fear of
senior management involvement in detailed decision
making. It has been my management philosophy
that when my boss is in the same meeting with me,
my vote is canceled. This concept places the manager
in the delicate position of deciding which meetings
the boss should attend.
The industry performance incentive program insures
your boss's personal interest in anything you do that
can affect the bottom line and the boss's paycheck.
However, a successful project leader must have
control of the resources necessary to ensure success.
The Golden Rule
In both NASA and industry, the golden rule applies.
The manager with the gold--rules. Make sure you
receive and control the money needed to accomplish
your mission. If either your boss or your boss's boss
controls the money, they in fact control the project. A
project manager simply must control all the
resources necessary for mission success, or some
method of accountability must be devised.
Find Something to Count
After you understand your objectives, establish your
baseline and obtain a contract and resources, it is
then necessary to check your progress by frequent
reviews and analyses. Managers in government
19
can't measure performance against the industry
profit milestone. But they can find things to count
and they can measure progress by establishing
performance standards and by variance reporting. A
few examples of countable items:
• Data points
• Computer runs
• Documents released
• Reports published
• Pieces of hardware
• Value ofwork performed
• Money spent
• Manpower expended
• Time lost or saved
• Test hours
• Major milestones reached
• Review points completed
Performance Feedback
Do not be afraid to alter plans, specifications, and
resources, based on past performance and future
expectations. Good managers know where they are
going by a critical analysis of where they have been.
When changing the baseline, make sure you
communicate up and down and that all are working
to the revised plan.
A good manager stays involved in the details through
an effective review program. Stress early problem
identification and aggressive application of remedial
measures.
As in planning, both NASA and industry do an
outstanding job of performance measurement.
Mission success is a goal in both organizations, and
management tools have been developed for effective
control of large R& D projects.
Cost Management
The first rule of good cost management is to set aside
dollars for a rainy day. Identify reserves and develop
a management plan for control and allocation of
those reserves. Perform a risk analysis and identify
the program cost drivers. Have a shopping list of cost
offsets to provide additional margin. Make sure you
can reduce performance and schedule constraints to
reduce cost. My industry experience indicates that
the ability to retain cash reserves for effective cost
management is extremely difficult. Matrix
organizations tend to assign resources to functional
organizations, thereby making it difficult to retain
reserves. Industry can learn much from NASA in the
art of contingency planning.
A Strong NASA/Contractor Project
Relationship
Experience shows that the best relationships hinge
on two major factors. First and foremost, the two
parties must establish a strong and active
communication network. Every effort should be
made immediately after contract to start to generate
an effective reporting system with strong emphasis
on the early identification of problems and
improvements in communication methods and tools.
The parties must also agree to complete near-term
action items early, to identify "one-on-one"
relationships clearly and to secure senior
management participation.
The second factor is to establish an honest and open
relationship. This usually takes hard work on the
part of both parties. It is critical to the success of the
project that both parties are dealing from the same
data base when formulating policies and making
decisions. Remember, the NASA and the contractor
are both interested in the same result--a successfully
completed project within the cost and schedule
constraints prescribed by the NASA. Experience in
industry indicates that the profit motive is important
to the contractor but not at the expense of NASA
dissatisfaction. I believe the long-term involvement
in civil space and aeronautics is rated higher than
profit. The challenges of a NASA program help
attract new technical skills to a company, thereby
fostering long-term growth.
NASA managers should be sensitive to this emphasis
on long-term capabilities vs. short-term profit by
stressing a complete and honest relationship. If
changes are caused by a NASA decision or event, the
NASA team should expect the contractor to receive a
fair adjustment in both cost and fee. On the other
hand, if contractors have performance problems, they
should be prepared to fix the problems without
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benefit of a fee adjustment. Both parties striving
toward this type of open and honest exchange will
establish the trust so critical to the achievements of
project objectives and mission success.
This open and honest relationship between NASA
and contractor hinges upon strong communication.
The project manager can communicate in a number
of ways: by computer, telephone, voice, the written
word, gestures, tone, style, etc. But the successful
project leaders communicate best by personal
example. They are role models for the next
generation of managers. Their ideas and aspirations,
especially their vision, are communicated even more
clearly than their words. That vision will have
impact far beyond the day-to-day project and will
invariably extend to relationships within NASA, the
cooperation of contractors, the team spirit for mission
success and the users of the project--the customers,
taxpayers and beneficiaries of an on-time, on-budget
project. The ripple effects of a well-managed project
(as we have seen from earlier spaceflight programs)
will last for years if not generations.
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My Lessons Learned
Never lose your capacity for enthusiasm.
Never lose your capacity for indignation.
Never judge and classify people too
quickly; first assume always that they are
good.
Never be impressed by wealth alone or
thrown by poverty.
If you can't be generous when it's hard to
be, you won't be when it's easy.
The greatest builder of confidence is the
ability to do something, almost anything,
well.
When that confidence comes, strive for
humility, for you aren't as good as all
that.
The way to become truly useful is to seek
the best that other brains have to offer.
Use them to supplement your own, and be
prepared to give credit to them when they
have helped.
The greatest tragedies in work and
personal events stem from
misunderstanding. Communicate.
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Controlling Resources in the Apollo Program
by C. Thomas Newman
Assistant Deputy Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Following is a slightly modified version of a paper
written as part of our training effort for new staff
members and interns in the Apollo Resources Control
group in the Office of Manned Space Flight. Some of
the points may seem elementary today, but I think
many of the points are worth repeating. My tendency
is to emphasize personal involvement and
responsibility for estimates and conclusions. To some
extent, this paper reflects my concern that the
emphasis on automation tends to de-emphasize these
concerns. Nevertheless, today I would put more
emphasis on cost rate analysis, discussed below.
What We Are Trying To Do
One objective is to make sure that the budget plan
really reflects the intent of management. This
means the estimates must cover the program that
management has approved and that there must be a
reasonable basis to believe that the estimated
amounts will buy what they are intended to.
Conventional budget reviews have been directed
toward making sure the estimates are not padded. In
R&D programs, the real problem is often one of
underestimating what it takes to do a job, in both
time and money. Any energetic agency has more
good ideas than dollars. The budget process is aimed
at getting as much program as possible within the
dollars available, and at the same time making sure
that we do not unknowingly take on commitments
which we cannot support within the available
funding. An important part of our analysis effort is
to make sure that the estimated resources are a
reasonably valid reflection of what it would really
cost to do each option.
An essential function of our office is to get
obligational authority from the review levels above
it. This means preparing and supporting budget
requests and, more importantly, preparing our own
top management to support the budget request.
Looking in the other direction, we must determine
how much obligational authority the offices really
need. What we want to do is to provide for a tolerably
sufficient but somewhat uncomfortable allocation.
There is no question in my mind that a certain
amount of pressure caused by funding levels below
apparent demands is essential to any sort of
management discipline.
Other vital activities in monitoring progress are to
determine if the use of funds is in accord with the
agreed-to plan or known intent to deviate from the
plan; any units are running too far over or under
availability; or reallocation of funds is needed.
Another function is to keep management informed.
The key here is to sort out the type of information
and the level of detail that are really useful to
management. This depends in large part on the
personality and interests of the manager. I believe
that the most common mistake in this regard is to try
to give the manager too much unfocused detail.
Approach: How We Do It
The way you work depends somewhat on your level
in the organization, the management relationships
with other offices, and the people involved. I think,
however, some general techniques are applicable to
almost any sort of budget review function.
Personal contact is usually more important than
paper work. In many organizations, you get your
important points across to top management by
telling them rather than writing to them. You learn
more about what is really going on by talking to
people than by reading reports. One important
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technique is assigning reliability factors to people.
Over a period of time you come to know that
information received from some sources will almost
always be right and well considered, whereas other
sources are relatively unreliable. Other people will
form an evaluation of your reliability factor with
respect to both the information they get from you and
the use you are likely to make of information you get
from them. Establishing a good reliability factor for
yourself and assessing that of others are two of the
most important things you do.
The concept of correlation and probability testing
applies to just about any sort of learning and
evaluation process. Common sense correlation is,
to my mind, the most important technique in
assessing data. This means that, over time, you
formulate an idea of what things ought to cost and,
when any new estimates are presented, you have a
basis for comparison. You are constantly testing the
probability that what you hear or read is correct.
Does it make sense when put beside what you
already know?
Besides correlating various inputs of information on
costs, you need to compare dollar estimates with non-
fiscal data such as progress against scheduled
accomplishments, complexity of work to be done,
possible knowledge of other work assigned to the
same organization, and other relevant factors you
know. Multiple sources of data should be sought and
the results constantly compared.
The type of correlation I have in mind is more
intuitive than mechanical. It becomes a habit; it
grows on you. To promote its growth, you need to
develop a reservoir of knowledge on your own
programs and related programs. You need an
understanding of what needs to be done to make the
program succeed. You need a general grasp of the
technical problems, the management problems, the
political environment, and the capabilities of the
people we are relying on to do the job. It takes time
and effort to acquire this background. You need to
conscientiously study the hardware and operational
aspects of the program. You also need to spend time
working with the numbers. You need to "own" the
figures. I believe that you are more likely to develop
this by personally working with the numbers rather
than relying on automated data. Once you have done
enough of this work with the proper frame of mind,
the correlations will come naturally. Your mind will
accept or reject figures, often without knowing the
specific reasons, but you will usually be right.
A great deal of work has been done to establish
mechanical means of correlating funding estimates
with factors such as weight, complexity, speed, size,
production rates, etc. So far, these efforts have been
only partly successful and do not provide a substitute
for well-developed intuitive judgment.
It is almost always true that the whole is better than
the sum of the parts. In developing estimates, I
believe in building up pieces to the extent that time
and knowledge permit a reasonable job to be done,
but this should always be correlated against a broad
scope look at the overall picture. If there is a conflict
in the results, I would base my judgment on what a
common-sense look at what the overall picture says
rather than a meticulous addition of the pieces. I
believe that excessive immersion in detail is not only
tedious but also can be detrimental to doing a good
job at the overall program level. A balance between
specific knowledge of details and judgment at the
total level is needed.
Cost rate analysis is an important way to look at
overall program trends. Contractors build
momentum which is not easily changed. It is like a
river that keeps on flowing no matter how hard you
blow on the surface. In most cases you can safely
judge that cost and manpower utilization rates will
not change rapidly unless some very strong pressure
is applied or some unusual program factors are
involved.
A commonly misunderstood technique is what I call
the "spot probe." In reviewing an estimate, you probe
in depth into a specific item. You ask difficult and
detailed questions and generally give the person
defending the estimates a hard time. This can be
done in a civil manner. You are not really interested
in the specific details, but you are trying to
determine how carefully the estimates have been
developed. Probe several points. You should not
judge too much by a test of any one area; but by
probing several areas, you do get a feeling for the
degree of confidence you can place in the work that
went into developing the estimates. Be careful in
applying this technique. Do not embarrass people
unnecessarily. You will be dealing with them later.
If a proper rapport is maintained, you can work with
them to correct any deficiencies you find.
Communications Upward
The work of building a budget or resources plan and
monitoring performance against the plan is wasted
unless:
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I• It enables you to do a job that you need to do
• It gives your management the information it
needs to do its job, or
• It answers questions that need to be answered.
Give management the answers it really needs and
wants--not the answers you think it would be nice for
them to have. They already receive more
information than they can handle. If a part of
management has been delegated formally or
informally to the resources office, I believe that
authority should be exercised with only as much
feedback to top management as they really want.
Try not to take questions to management take
solutions and take them only when there is a real
reason to do so.
Examples of key questions that the resources office
needs to be ready to answer are:
• Are we staying within our fund availability?
• Do we have enough funding to get the job done?
• Are there some areas where we have allocated
more than we really need?
How much room do we have within our fund
availability to expand our plan or to take on new
work?
• What are our problem areas and what are we
doing about them?
We need to be ready to go into detail, but I think the
basic guideline is to tell management what it needs
to know--not what you think would be interesting.
The other types of reporting upward involve Review
Authorities and Public Information. My basic
ground rule is: ANSWER THE QUESTION ASKED.
Don't volunteer information not requested. Answer
honestly and simply in a manner that is meaningful
to the recipient. If, for policy or other reasons, you
can't give an honest answer, don't answer at all.
Better to take some guff for not answering than to
destroy your reliability rating. One qualification is
that so long as you are on the payroll, you must
support the agency policy and decisions even if you
don't agree. The top management knows things you
don't know which may make their decisions the best
possible under the circumstances.
Characteristics of an Analyst
What are the characteristics we look for and seek to
develop in a budget or resources analyst? I think the
main factors are:
1. Reliability
2. A"why"mentality
3. A numbers sense
4. Interest in the program and enough
background to understand it
5. Ability to work with others under stress
6. Willingness to get involved in a lot of
"spread-sheet" work
7. A feeling for the big picture, even when
working the detail
8. Ability to express ideas, oral and written
9. A sense of timing
10. Common sense and sound judgment
Reliability. This is probably the main qualification
for any job. The person you are working for needs to
know that you can be counted on for your best efforts
and good judgment in carrying out any assignment.
"Why" Mentality. Whenever you are given
information, there should be an automatic
questioning of why this can or cannot be accepted at
face value and how it relates to what you already
know. The approach is not one of questioning
integrity of the persons providing the information;
but, in many cases, they will not have gone through
this thinking process themselves. Before we can
really use the information, we need to understand it.
Numbers Sense, It is my observation that numbers
talk to some people the way words do to others. A
good analyst needs a real feel for the numbers. I
don't know why some people seem to have this and
others don't, but I believe it is largely a matter of
habit, interest, and basic aptitude.
Interest in the Program. To enjoy budgeting, you
need a real feeling of identification with the program
for which you are budgeting. As a minimum, you
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need enough interest to acquire the basic knowledge
to understand what you are budgeting for. Usually
your effectiveness will increase in direct proportion
to your real concern for accomplishing the objectives
of the program.
Ability to Work with Others. You are always
reliant on the work of other people. Sometimes our
requests on others are somewhat unreasonable and
have the potential of working against their interests.
There is necessarily a good deal of stress involved in
a budget operation, but success is dependent on
ability to maintain a satisfactory rapport with the
people with whom you need to work. [ believe the
main elements in this capability are:
• Openness in letting them know what we are
doing,
• Giving them a sense of confidence on how we will
use data, and
An ability to distinguish between friction that
arises in business and your personal relationship
with an individual.
Detail Work. I believe that an analyst should
actually enjoy a certain amount of spread-sheet
work, even if it is partially automated. In my
opinion, you need to work with the figures before
they really become part of your thought processes.
Big Picture. All of our detail work is done for a
purpose. To be effective, you need to be able to keep
the objective in mind even while you are working on
the detail. You also need an ability to depart from
the detail approach when the objective requires that
you do so. You need to be prepared to accept the fact
that those above you may reach conclusions which
differ from the results of your detailed analysis. You
need to realize that the detail work is only one input
into a large arena of decision-making.
Communication. For the results of our work to be
effective, we need to express our ideas and
conclusions both orally and in writing. We need to
learn to express them in a way that will reach the
person for whom they are intended. Often, the
ability to put the message into a concise written form
is a good test of your real understanding. The
approach will differ with different people and at
different levels of management. For the top level, we
need to say what needs to be said briefly and clearly
when the opportunity presents itself.
Sense of Timing. This involves judgment as to
which deadline needs to be met. It also means
acceptance of the fact that a 70% job available a half-
hour before a meeting is usually better than a 100%
job a half-hour after the meeting. One of the most
important aspects of providing support to
management is providing it when needed. As an
analyst, you need to be willing to take the risks
involved in providing something less than a
completely satisfactory product in time to do some
good. This is a matter of accepting the goals involved
in the overall purpose of the work rather than taking
particular pride in any individual piece of the total
effort.
Common Sense and Good Judgment. A
requirement for these characteristics is inherent in
any responsible job. It is implied in all of the above
points. The need for common sense and judgment
becomes especially important when guidance is
inadequate, when there is not enough time to meet
all requirements, or when dealing with matters
which have become emotional issues. [n much of our
work, all three of these factors are present.
General Comment on Qualifications
No mention has been made on academic training.
Over the years, I have worked with many excellent
analysts, and [ am not aware of any particular
correlation of specific types of education and success
in budgeting. Some accounting and management
courses are probably desirable, if not taken too
seriously. In programs such as space or defense,
some background in science and engineering can be
helpful. Training in written and oral communication
has value. In general, I believe successful
performance in the academic and work environment
is more important than any specific training.
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Programs, Projects, and Headaches
by Homer Newell
Former Chief Scientist, NASA
(from his 1981 book Beyond the Atmosphere)
As with its predecessor, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, NASA's principal
technical strength lay in the field centers. At the
time of the metamorphosis into an aeronautics and
space agency, NACA had three principal centers: the
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory near Hampton,
Virginia; the Ames Aeronautical IJaboratory at
Moffett Field, California; and the Lewis Flight
Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland. [n addition
there was a tIigh Speed Flight Station at Edwards
Air Force Base in California and a small rocket test
facility on the Virginia coast at Wallops Island. The
first four of these became under NASA the Langley,
Ames, Lewis, and Flight Research Centers, the
research orientation of which Deputy Administrator
Hugh Dryden was so desirous of protecting. Wallops
Station was assigned primarily to the space science
program.
To the former NACA installations, NASA added six
more: the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt,
Maryland; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in
Pasadena; the John F. Kennedy Space Center at
Merritt Island, Florida; the George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama; the
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (which for many
years was known as the Manned Spacecraft Center)
in Houston; and, briefly, an Electronics Research
Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which was
transferred to the Department of Transportation. A
sizable facility for testing large rocket engines was
established in Mississippi not far from New Orleans
and placed administratively under Marshall, which
had prime responsibility for the Saturn launch
vehicles used in the Apollo and Skylab programs.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Marshall were
transferred to NASA from the Army; the others were
created by NASA. As its original name suggests,
Johnson was in charge of the Mercury, Gemini, and
Apollo spacecraft and most of the research and
development was related to those programs.
Kennedy, originally the Launch Operations
Directorate of Marshall, provided launch support
services for both manned and unmanned programs,
but the former required by far the greater capital
investment and manpower. Both Goddard and the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory were principal centers for
the space science program, the former for scientific
satellites, the latter for planetary probes.
Management at headquarters guided the space
program, directed the overall planning, developed
and defended the budget for the agency, and fostered
the kinds of external relations and general support
that the space program needed. In a very real sense
headquarters people labored at the center of action
where the political decisions were made that
permitted the space program to proceed. Yet the
story of headquarters activity is mostly one of
context, of background--essential, indispensable, but
background nevertheless--against which the actual
space program was conducted. Research, the essence
of the space science program, was done by scientists
at NASA centers, in universities, and at private and
industrial laboratories.
It follows that the mainstream of space science must
be traced through the activities of these institutions.
With occasional exceptions, like the upper
atmospheric research of the Geophysical Research
Corporation of America and the pioneering work of
American Science and Engineering in x-ray
astronomy, the contribution of industry was more to
the development and flight of space hardware than to
conducting scientific research. It remains, then, to
take a look at the part played by the NASA centers.
The principal space science centers were the Goddard
Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL being operated by California
Institute of Technology under contract to NASA).
Wallops Island, which for a time was placed
administratively under Goddard, provided essential
support to the sounding rocket and Scout launch
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vehicle programs. But not all NASA space science
was done at these centers. The Ames Research
Center managed the Pioneer Interplanetary probes
and took the lead in space biology and exobiology--a
term coined to denote the search for and
investigation of extraterrestrial life or life-related
processes. Langley had responsibility for the Lunar
Orbiter and later the Viking Mars probe. Most
notable was the lunar research fostered by Johnson
in the early 1970s with the samples of the moon and
other Apollo lunar data, which for a time made
Houston a veritable Mecca for lunar scientists. But
Apollo lunar science was an exception generated by
the special nature of the manned lunar exploration
program; and, generally, Dryden's policy stood in the
way of more than a limited participation of the
research centers in space projects.
Over the years the NASA centers built up an
enviable reputation of success on all fronts, in
manned spaceflight, space applications, and space
science. In the last mentioned, by 1970 Goddard had
flown more than 1000 sounding rockets, more than
40 Explorer satellites, 6 solar observatories, 6
geophysical observatories, and 3 astronomical
observatories, most of them successfully. In
applications Goddard enjoyed comparable or better
success rates with weather and communications
satellites. The experience of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory was similar. By the end of the 1960s JPL
had sent 3 Rangers and 5 Surveyors on successful
missions to the moon and dispatched 5 Mariners to
Mars and Venus. These achievements are bound to
be recounted repeatedly and will rightfully be judged
as success stories. Success, however, was not bought
without a price of some mistakes, temporary failures,
and occasionally severe personal conflict, which form
an instructive part of the total history. In reviewing
the struggles and problems that preceded the
achievements, a proper sense of perspective is
important, for troubles often tend to magnify
themselves in the eye of the beholder. The
difficulties were, after all, overcome in the ultimate
successes that were achieved. Still, as part of the
total story, perhaps as illustrating the natural and
usual course of human undertakings, those
difficulties are important to the historian. They
should also be instructive to later managers. Thus,
without at all deprecating their splendid
achievements, it is appropriate to delve briefly into
some of the trials endured by the Goddard Space
Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
The Character of the Field Centers
The different centers in NASA had distinctive
personalities that one could sense in dealing with
them. As might be expected the former NACA
laboratories kept as NASA centers many of the
characteristics they had acquired in their previous
incarnation. One trait was the fierce organizational
loyalty that had been displayed as part of NACA."
Thus, while officials at those centers were convinced
that the real power of the agency lay in the centers
and felt very strongly that they should have some
voice in formulating orders, and also that once given
an assignment they should be left alone to carry it
out, they also recognized that the ultimate authority
lay in headquarters. Given marching orders, they
would march much as ordered.
The new centers in NASA had their difficulties in
this regard, to varying degrees. The Marshall center
reflected the background and personality of its
leader, Wernher yon Braun, and his team of German
rocket experts. Bold, with a bulldog determination,
undaunted by the sheer magnitude of a project like
Saturn, they could hardly be deterred by request or
by command from their plotted course. The effort to
superimpose the Juno space science launchings and
the Centaur launch vehicle development on the
Marshall team, when Saturn represented its real
aspiration, simply did not work out. The Juno
launchings had to be canceled after a string of dismal
failures, which space science managers in
headquarters felt was caused by lack of sufficient
attention on the part of the center. Centaur, in the
midst of congressional investigation into poor
progress, was reassigned to the Lewis Research
Center. The Manned Spacecraft Center developed an
arrogance born of unbounded self-confidence and
possession of a leading role in the nation's number-
one space project, Apollo. A combination of self-
assurance, the need to be meticulously careful in the
development and operation of hardware for manned
spaceflight, plus a general disinterest in the
objectives of space science as the scientists saw them,
led to extreme difficulties in working with the
scientific community. But the art of being difficult
was not confined to the manned spaceflight centers.
In this both the Goddard Space Flight Center and the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory were worthy competitors.
So, too, was headquarters, for that matter.
The Goddard Space Flight Center's collective
personality stemmed from its space science origins.
As the first new laboratory to be established by
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NASA, Goddard inherited most of the programs and
activities of the International Geophysical Year, like
the Vanguard satellite program and tbe Minitrack
tracking and telemetering network. Also, many of
the scientists and engineers of the Rocket and
Satellite Research Panel and the IGY sounding
rocket and scientific satellite programs joined
Goddard to make up, along with the Vanguard team,
the nucleus out of which the center developed. These
origins indelibly stamped Goddard as a space science
center, even though science accounted for only about
one-third of the laboratory's work (and by the nature
of things, most of that effort went into the
development, testing, and operation of sounding
rockets, spacecraft, and space launch vehicles
required for the scientific research). In actuality only
a small fraction of the Goddard Space Flight Center's
personnel was engaged in space science research.
Nevertheless, the presence of those persons in key
positions, which they came to fill as charter members
of the laboratory, imparted to the center a character
that accounted simultaneously for its success in
space science and for many of the difficulties
experienced with upper levels of management.
As professional scientists, these persons were by
training and experience accustomed to deciding for
themselves what ought to be done in their
researches. While subjecting themselves to a
rigorous self-discipline required to accomplish their
investigations, they nevertheless approached their
work in a highly individualistic manner. They
questioned everything, including orders from above.
While they could and did work effectively as groups,
their cooperation included a great deal of debate and
free-wheeling exchange on what was best to do at
each stage. To trained engineers in NASA--for whom
a smoothly functioning team, accepting orders from
the team leader as a matter of course, was the
professional way of going about things--the
seemingly casual approach of the Goddard scientists
looked too undisciplined to work.
The Goddard scientists had also been accustomed to
determining their own objectives and pacing
themselves as they thought best. The
accomplishment of an experiment that produced
significant new information was what counted; costs
and schedules were secondary. That a project took
longer to carry out than had originally been
estimated was of little consequence so long as the
project succeeded, particularly if the additional time
was put to good use improving an experiment and
ensuring success. This peculiarly science-related
sociology of the space scientists at Goddard
reinforced the tensions that naturally come into play
between a headquarters and the field in large
organizations, and led to a major confrontation in the
mid-1960s.
Field Versus Headquarters
Headquarters and field in any effective and
productive organization support each other, working
as a team in the pursuit of common goals--those of
the organization. Yet many aspects in even the most
normal of headquarters-field relationships serve to
pit one against the other at times. When
circumstances exacerbate those normal centrifugal
tendencies, serious trouble can arise. To understand
the nature of the problem, a few words about the
difference in headquarters and center jobs in a
technical organization like NASA are in order.
At the heart of the difference is the matter of
programs and projects. The raison d'etre of an
agency is reflected in its various programs, where the
term program is used to mean a long-term,
continuing endeavor to achieve an accepted set of
goals and objectives. NASA's overall program in
space included the exploration of the moon and the
planets, scientific investigations by means of rockets
and spacecraft, and the development of ways of
applying space methods to the solution of important
practical problems. Each of these programs could be,
and when convenient was, thought of as a complex of
subprograms, such as a program to develop and put
into use satellite meteorology, a program to improve
communications by means of artificial satellites, or a
program to investigate the nature of the cosmos.
Barring an arbitrary decision to call a halt, one could
foresee no reason why these programs, including the
subprograms, should not continue indefinitely.
Certainly, if past experience is a good indicator, the
effort to understand the universe must continue to
turn up new fundamental questions as fast as old
ones are answered. As for exploration, the vastness
of space, even of that relatively tiny portion of the
universe occupied by the solar system, is so great
that generations could visit planets and satellites
and still leave most of the job undone. And it would
be a long while before diminishing returns would call
for an end to applications programs.
Unlike a program, a project was thought of as of
limited duration and scope, as, for example, the
Explorer II project to measure gamma rays from the
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galaxy and intergalactic space. A program was
carried out by a continuing series of projects, and at
any given time the agency would be conducting a
collection of projects designed to move the agency a
number of steps toward the agency's programmatic
goals and objectives. The Explorer II project
contributed to the programmatic objective of
understanding the universe by determining an upper
limit to the rate of production of gamma rays in
intergalactic space, which eliminated one candidate
version of the continuous creation theory of the
universe.
A project like a sounding rocket experiment might be
aimed at only a single specific objective, last only a
few months or a year, and cost but a few tens of
thousands of dollars. Or a project could require a
series of space launchings, many tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars, and take years to
accomplish. The Lunar Orbiter, with five separate
launchings to the moon, and the Mariner-Mars
project that sent two spacecraft to Mars in 1971 were
examples. Some projects were huge in every aspect,
as was Apollo. In fact, because of its size and scope,
Apollo was more often than not referred to as a
program, although more properly Apollo should be
thought of as a mammoth project which served
several programs, among them the continuing
development of a national manned spaceflight
capability, the exploration of space, and the scientific
investigation of the moon.
With these definitions of program and project in
mind, one can describe rather simply the difference
between headquarters and center jobs. Headquarters
was concerned primarily with the programmatic
aspects of what NASA was up to, whereas the task of
the centers was mainly to carry out the many projects
that furthered the agency's programs. The
distinction is a valid but not a rigid one.
Occasionally headquarters people participated in
project work, but this was an exception to the general
rule. The most notable exception was Apollo, the size
and scope of which were such as to make the
administrator feel that the uppermost levels of
management for the project should be kept in
Washington. Nevertheless, the prime task of
headquarters, working with the centers and
numerous outside advisors, was to put together the
NASA program, to decide on the projects best
designed at the moment to carry out the program and
assign them to the appropriate centers for execution,
and to foster the external relationships that would
generate the necessary support for the programs and
projects. As an essential concomitant to
programming, much time was occupied in preparing
budgets, selling them to the administration, and
defending them before Congress.
Also, each center, while project-oriented, had its
center programs toward which the center directed its
own short- and long-range planning. Thus, the
research centers conducted programs of advancing
aeronautical and space technology. In addition to a
program of space science, the Goddard Space Flight
Center pursued extensive programs of space
applications and space tracking and data acquisition,
with tracking and acquisition occupying almost 40
percent of the center's manpower. Unmanned
investigation of the solar system was the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory's principal program.
Although the qualifications should be kept in mind to
have the correct picture, nevertheless the main
distinction between the responsibilities of
headquarters and those of the centers is clear.
Center personnel members were primarily occupied
with project work, while headquarters people spent--
or should have spent--their time on program matters.
That is where difficulties arose, for numerous
pressures drove headquarters managers to get
involved in project or project-related work. Such
actions could only be regarded by a center as undue
interference from above.
Naturally, NASA space science managers were
vitally interested in what was happening in the
various space science projects. They were responsible
for proper oversight. But there was more to it than
that; project work was where the action was. That
was where interesting problems were being attacked
and where exciting results were being obtained.
Alongside project work, programmatic planning
often seemed like onerous drudgery. As a
consequence oversight tended to degenerate into
meddling, to the distress of project managers and
center directors. Even when headquarters managers
took pains to couch their thoughts in the form of mere
suggestions, their positions in headquarters made
suggestions look more like orders. That program
chiefs in headquarters occupied staff, not line,
positions often was lost sight of in the shuffle, and
some headquarters managers became adept at
wielding what amounted in practice to line
authority.
To this natural tendency to get into the act were
added the pressures of the job. As the NASA
program grew in size, scope, and expense, upper
3O
levels of management demanded more and more
detail on schedules, costs, and technical problems.
Nor was the demand for information confined to
NASA management. Becoming increasingly
familiar with the programs and their projects, the
legislators also demanded what seemed an
impossible amount of detail, either to provide while
still getting the job done or for the Congress to
assimilate. On the science side, members of the
authorizing subcommittee in the House, under
Chairman Joseph Karth of Minnesota, frequently
concerned themselves with the details of engineering
design decisions and were not loath to second-guess
space project engineers on matters that seemed to
NASA people to lie beyond the competence of the
legislators to judge. An example of this searching
interest was furnished by the investigation of the
Centaur liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen fueled
rocket stage which Karth's subcommittee undertook
in 1962. NASA and contract engineers found it
difficult to defend the propellant feed system which
they had chosen and which could be shown to be most
efficient for a rocket the size of Centaur, against a
different system for which the committee expressed a
preference and which admittedly would likely have
more growth potential.
Because of this increasing demand for information of
various kinds, headquarters in turn demanded of the
centers the detailed reporting that centers felt was
appropriate for project managers but went far beyond
what headquarters really needed. While program
managers were willing to concede that the
information they were calling for was more than they
ought to need, yet they were caught in the middle; to
do their jobs as circumstances were shaping them,
they did need the data. They were forced, therefore,
to insist, and the extensive reporting required, with
its implied involvement of headquarters with what
were strictly center responsibilities, remained as a
continuing source of irritation.
The irritation transferred to headquarters when
centers were late or deficient in their reporting,
especially when a center simply refused, sometimes
through foot dragging, sometimes in open defiance,
to supply the information requested. A center might
be reluctant to respond when it felt that the request
was premature, that the data were not yet properly
developed, and that the center might later be called
to task if the information supplied prematurely
turned out to be incorrect.
A related source of irritation arose in connection with
the center's management process. At almost any
time throughout the year a program manager might
be called upon to furnish information about projects
in the program. It was essential, therefore, to be
continuously aware of the status of projects which
might have to be reported. For this it was not enough
to rely on written reports which came only so often.
In addition, space science program managers kept in
close touch with the project managers and attended
many of the meetings held by the project managers
with their staffs and with contractors'
representatives. This practice came to be a
particularly sore point with the management of
Goddard Space Flight Center.
Strains on the Family Tie
The Goddard Space Flight Center and NASA
Headquarters, only half an hour's drive apart, were
connected by close ties. Between the two staffs, many
personal associations dated from the days of the
Rocket and Satellite Research Panel and the
sounding rocket and satellite programs of the
International Geophysical Year. An easy
relationship existed from the very start of the center.
John Townsend--who served as acting director of the
center until the permanent director, Harry Goett,
formerly of NACA's Ames Aeronautical Laboratory,
took over--had been associated with John Clark and
the author at the Naval Research Laboratory. For
many years Townsend had been the author's deputy
in the NRL's Rocket Sonde Research Branch. Harry
Goett and Eugene Wasielewski, whom Goett brought
into Goddard as associate director, had long been
acquainted with Abe Silverstein from the days of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
These friendships served to mitigate the divisive
forces between headquarters and field, but were not
enough to avert an ultimate break.
Harry Goett assumed the directorship of Ooddard in
September 1959. As was his nature he quickly
entered personally into every aspect of the center's
work. From his first day until he left, he kept in close
touch with every project. As an untiring battler for
the center and his people, Goett endeared himself to
his coworkers. He was a warm, emotional person
who showed a deep interest in the men and women
working for him, and on both sides a deep affection
developed.
In the first weeks and months of NASA's planning for
its program, many center people had been drawn into
headquarters working groups to help get things
under way. But as center project work grew, these
assignments, which tended to persist, began to
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interfere with center duties. Finding Goddard people
still working on headquarters tasks a year after
NASA's start, Harry Goett began to protest that his
personnel should be relieved as fast as possible of
these additional duties. On the other hand, center
people's taking part in headquarters planning was
advantageous to the center. Both organizations tried
to keep center participation within reasonable
bounds.
As Goett, Townsend, and their people built up
Goddard and launched their initial projects, program
managers were developing their own methods of
keeping themselves and their superiors informed.
Simultaneously the Congress was increasing its
demand for detailed information, which it was
incumbent on headquarters to supply. As the
requirements for reporting increased, project
managers complained that they were spending too
much time with program managers and in preparing
reports, time that would be better spent in getting on
with the projects. In mounting crescendo, Goett
complained to the author and his deputy in the
headquarters space science office, Edgar M.
Cortright, that headquarters managers were getting
in the way of center management. Goett urged that
headquarters people keep their hands off project
management.
While agreeing in principle with the Goddard
director, Cortright and the author strove to get him
to see that in the existing climate of continuing
congressional scrutiny, keeping informed was an
important part of headquarters work. That, space
science management insisted, was an absolutely
essential part of the program manager's job, but not
to usurp the project manager's duties or to interfere
with other work. Cortright and the author urged
upon their people great care in working with the
project managers to avoid any kinds of action that
would undercut, or appear to undercut, the project
manager's responsibilities and authority. It was no
advantage to the program for any project managers
to feel that responsibilities had been in any way
lifted from their shoulders.
Headquarters was far from Simon pure in these
matters, unfortunately, and there was considerable
justice in Goett's complaints. The natural urge to
meddle plus the incessant pressure to keep informed
led many program managers to get into the project
business. Sometimes this led to strong adversary
relations between program and project managers; at
other times to close "buddy-buddy" relations. Both
situations caused problems for center management
and called for continuing attention.
By the fall of 1962, Goett found the situation so
disturbing that he felt impelled to complain openly at
a NASA management meeting held at the Langley
Research Center that headquarters got too much into
projects and should stick to program management.
His barbs were aimed not only at space science
managers, but also at those responsible for
applications programs and for tracking and data
acquisition, lie felt that there was not enough
contact between the center director and the associate
administrator. Goett also felt he did not have enough
contact with the author. The last complaint stemmed
from the mode of management the author had
adopted, about which a few words are in order.
Being a scientist, the author felt it wise to name as
deputy an engineer whose training and experience
would complement his own. Edgar M. Cortright, an
aeronautical engineer with considerable research
experience in the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, filled the bill very nicely. An
implication of this philosophy of organization was
that the deputy should be more than an understudy,
more than just someone to sit in when the principal
was away. Rather, the deputy should take
responsibility for important aspects of the top
management job that came within his sphere of
expertise. This was the arrangement agreed on
between Cortright and the author. Cortright would
handle engineering matters, which meant oversight
of much of the project work, dealing with contractors,
and a great deal of the relations with the space
science centers. The author would work on program
planning, advisory committees, and most of the space
science program's external relations including those
with the Academy of Sciences, the scientific
community, and the universities. Such an
arrangement had worked well at the Naval Research
Laboratory, where John Townsend's engineering and
experimental bent had complemented the author's
theoretical background. Moreover, in addition to
providing the top level of management in the office
with talents and experience complementing those of
the director, it was an effective way of providing a
deputy with substantive work and to continue his
professional growth. A deputy with nothing more to
do than to wait around for the principal to be away
must find life deadly dull, unrewarding, and
stultifying.
Under this arrangement, problems of the kind Goett
was wrestling with would normally have been taken
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up by Cortrigbt. But Goett was not willing to deal
with a deputy. As director of the Goddard Center--
even though the author was meticulously careful to
support agreements Cortright worked out--Goett felt
that he should deal directly with the principal in the
office for which the center was working. Under the
circumstances the author took special pains to make
it clear that he was available to Goett at any time,
yet expressed the hope that Goett would work with
Cortright in the normal course of day-to-day matters.
The strain caused by the project-management versus
program-management conflict took increasing
amounts of time and attention. A great deal of the
time spent with Goett was devoted to this problem.
John Townsend, Goett's man for space science
matters, pointed out that if a program manager had
only one project under way in his program, then it
became very difficult to draw a line between program
and project, and the pressure on the program
manager to get into project management was
overwhelming. Townsend recommended that
programs be put together in such a way that a
program manager would have several projects to deal
with. Under such an arrangement a program
manager could no longer give the single-minded
attention required by a project, and should find it
much easier to confine himself to program matters.
Cortright and the author agreed and tried to avoid
single-project programs.
Goett pointed out that it was not just the cases in
which program and project managers were at odds
that gave trouble. When the two got along well
together, often they would team up to promote their
project over other projects which the center
management--taking into account existing
constraints on dollars, manpower, and facilities--
might judge to be more appropriate. Thus, program
and project managers working hand in glove for their
own projects--perhaps to enlarge them or to extend
them beyond existing commitments--were not always
working for the best interests of the center.
Goett was most disturbed to have program managers,
in the name of keeping in touch, attend meetings
with outside contractors. Even if the headquarters
people came with the determination to keep their
mouths shut, contractors' representatives had a
penchant for tossing questions to the headquarters
representatives, with the implication that that was
where the final word would lie. And when
headquarters people did volunteer comments, their
comments tended to take on more weight than the
word of the project manager. These difficulties
became even worse when the headquarters man was
technically more competent than the project
manager--which Goett didn't feel could happen very
often. In that case the project manager tended to
defer to the headquarters person for decisions and
recommendations that the project manager should
make personally, and the contractors were easily
confused as to who was calling the shots.
Goett's solution to these problems would have been to
keep program managers away from project
management meetings, and especially away from
meeting with contractors. Considering the program
manager's basic responsibility to see to the health of
the program and the corresponding need to keep
informed--a need that was enhanced by the growing
amount of attention given by congressional
committees to NASA's programs and projects--
Goett's solution was not acceptable. Cortright and
the author spent a great deal of time trying to get
Goett to appreciate headquarters' needs and to agree
to some middle-of-the-road way out of the dilemma.
A written description was prepared of the distinction
between program management and project
management, and the author committed himself to
ensuring that the program people understood the
bounds of their authorities and responsibilities. But
the author also insisted that the way be kept open for
headquarters people to keep adequately informed.
Goett was not satisfied. In a letter to Associate
Administrator Robert C. Seamans 5 July 1963, he
outlined some of the problems as he saw them.
Shortly thereafter, on 26 July 1963, the Office of
Space Science and Applications proposed a revision of
NASA Management Instruction 37-1-1. In Appendix
A were specific definitions of program and project.
The instruction made the point that the
headquarters job concerned itself with program
matters primarily, while project managers normally
were at field centers. On 5 November 1963 the
author wrote Harry Goett on the subject of
headquarters-center relations. The letter outlined
agreements that it was hoped had been reached to
keep headquarters people properly informed, without
undercutting the center's position with contractors.
But matters continued to deteriorate.
Complaints were not confined to the center side. In a
talk given to a number of managers of space science
and applications projects, at Airlie House near
Warrenton, Virginia, the author spoke on relations
between program managers in headquarters and
project managers in the centers. By giving what was
viewed by headquarters people _ls too much emphasis
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to the rights and prerogatives of project managers,
the author drew forth some howls from the former.
On 30 December 1963 the staff of the Office of Space
Science and Applications met to discuss relations
with the Goddard Space Flight Center. Program
people complained that Goddard seemed to be waging
a war to keep headquarters at arm's length. It was
difficult to find out about contractor meetings in time
to attend. Although Goett had stated that
headquarters should keep itself informed by means of
the reports it received, still Goddard habitually did
not turn in reports on time. The center was being too
independent in formulating its plans for supporting
research; i.e., the general background research of the
kind all centers undertook in support of their project
work. Program chiefs felt a need to specify reporting
requirements for this supporting research, since most
of the money for such research came from portions of
the budget for which the program chiefs had
responsibility. Another complaint concerned
Requests for Proposals, documents which centers
sent to potential contractors asking for bids on work
that the center wanted done. Program people were
required to follow the progress of such RFPs through
the headquarters paper mill and to assist in
expediting their progress. It was important,
therefore, for them to keep in close touch with the
formulation of the work statements that would go
into the Requests for Proposals. Yet the center
appeared to be making it difficult for the program
managers to keep in touch. The Interplanetary
Monitoring Platform project was considered an
illustration of the center's intentions in this regard.
Since a decision that program people would attend
"working group" meetings of projects, Paul Butler,
manager of the IMP project, had ceased to hold
working group meetings. Instead he held what he
called "coordination meetings" with his staff, which
headquarters people were explicitly told they were
expected not to attend.
While the managers in the Office of Space Science
and Applications were most intimately involved in
the day-to-day relations with the center, the
problems also had the continuing attention of Webb,
Dryden, and Seamans. Concerned about overruns
and schedule slips in NASA projects, the
Administrator's Office noted that many of the bad
examples were Goddard's. As general manager of the
agency, Associate Administrator Seamans
maintained pressure on the Office of Space Science
and Applications to correct the deficiencies.
Although Seamans had known and worked with
Harry Goett since 1948 and admired him very much,
Seamans could not accept Goett's insistence that
headquarters leave Goddard to its own devices. As
Seamans wrote years later:
• . . it was essential if NASA was to continue to
receive Congressional support, that we tighten
the management of our projects in order to keep
costs and schedules closer to plan. We could not,
in the public interest, take it on faith that Harry
Goett was doing all that could be done to manage
these projects properly. It was necessary for
NASA Headquarters to have direct access to a
variety of management data as was the case with
other NASA centers. ! kept Dr. Dryden and Mr.
Webb fully informed of the
Headquarters/Goddard relationships and of
important issues.
But the problems did not end. Discussions with
Goddard management seemed to elicit too much
explanation of why it was in the nature of things for
schedules to slip and not enough desire to change
matters. The Goddard scientists especially could not
see why there should be any urgency about adhering
to a schedule if additional work would produce a
better experiment. As for the experiments, usually
there was no reason why they should be done now
rather than later, unless of course, they had to be
timed to coincide with some natural event. But
NASA's record of doing what it said it would do on
time and within cost was important to those who had
to fight for the agency's appropriations. Schedules
and costs were most visible to a carefully watchful
Congress, and for years NASA continued to feel that
it had to sell itself. Besides, it was just plain good
management to estimate costs and schedules
correctly and then keep to those estimates.
Whatever opinion the Administrator's Office might
have had as to who was the more to blame for the
strains caused by projects versus programs, the
apparent unresponsiveness of the center on
tightening up project management overshadowed the
other concerns. Both Associate Administrator
Robert Seamans and his deputy, Earl Hilburn,
pressed continually for better performance. But
when, in a stressful meeting with Seamans, Goett
took such a rigid position that he left no
maneuvering room for headquarters, the associate
administrator decided that Goett had to go. With the
concurrence of both Webb and Dryden, on 22 July
1965 Seamans removed Goett from the directorship
and replaced him with Dr. John F. Clark, who had
been chief scientist in the Office of Space Science and
Applications.
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It was a traumatic experience for Harry Goett and for
others. The author found it a most unpleasant duty
to go out to the Goddard Space Flight Center to meet
with key managers and inform them that their
director was being replaced. Goett was beloved of his
people; he had been a conscientious, hard-working,
imaginative director, under whose regime the center
had achieved most of the space accomplishments of
NASA's first few years. Goett himself had played a
key role in establishing a productive relationship
with the academic community. Those
accomplishments were, of course, the real story of the
Goddard Space Flight Center, not the struggles over
how to manage. It was tragic that Goett's obsession
over one concept of headquarters-field relationships--
born perhaps of his past experience in the NACA--
made him unable to appreciate the new climate in
which NASA had to operate. It was unfortunate that
the author was unable to work out some
accommodation that would have kept Goett at the
Goddard helm. Harry Goett's departure was a
distinct loss to NASA.
Not having Goett's flair for the controversial, John
Clark projected a more pedestrian image for the
center. Yet under his administration, Goddard
continued its record of successful space science and
applications flights. The problems remained, and
both center and headquarters had to work
continuously to keep them under control. But both
sides approached the problems with a better
understanding of each other's needs. In short order
Clark was telling headquarters where to head in, and
headquarters was pressing him to get on with the job
of better resource and schedule management.
The difficulties experienced by the Office of Space
Science and Applications with the Goddard Space
Flight Center occurred in various forms and varying
degrees with all the other centers. The task of
finding ways for headquarters and field to work
together harmoniously and effectively is never
ending. Nor is it to be expected that tension between
headquarters and field will ever disappear. Should
this happen, one or the other will probably not be
doing its best job.
Lewis Research
Center
Ames Research
Center
Dryden Flight
Research Facilit
Jet PropuJsion
Laboratory
Goddard Inst. for
Space Studies
Goddard Space
Flight Center
NASA
Headquarters
LResearch
Center
JSC White Sands
Test Facility
Johnson Space
Center
Stennis Space
Center
Michoud Assembly
Facility
Slldell Computer
Complex
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Kennedy Space
Center
O_¢. 1010,_ ,
I{107 B_
35

Evolution of a Technical
Management Organization
by Thomas J. Lee
Deputy Director, Marshall Space Flight Center
To accept that a particular philosophy or system of
management is superior or even applicable, it is
essential that its basis be identified and understood.
To satisfy that objective and to provide some insight
into what has and is working in the successful
management of projects at the George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) we first need to
understand the background and evolution of the
Center organization and then how major
adjustments were made to accommodate the
changing objectives. We can then examine specific
"lessons learned" from the Spacelab Program, a
highly successful, international cooperative
program involving the United States and a
consortium of 10 European countries.
BACKGROUND
MSFC was formed in 1960 from the nucleus of the
Wernher yon Braun team which, until it became a
part of NASA, had functioned primarily as a
propulsion development organization under the
"arsenal concept" with the U.S. Army Ballistic
Missile Defense Agency (ABMA). This concept was
simply that all aspects of design, development, and
initial production were under the direct control of
ABMA. The concept worked well for limited
production of research and development projects. In
fact, it was under this concept that the first
Redstone and Jupiter missiles and the first stages of
Saturn l and IB and Saturn V launch vehicle
systems were designed, manufactured, and tested at
Redstone Arsenal and successfully launched by the
Missile Firing Laboratory, which later formed the
core of the Kennedy Space Center organization.
The apparent disadvantage to this concept was that
it did not lend itself to high production or to
optimum utilization of the U.S. aerospace industry,
which was recognized in the early 1960s as
essential to meeting the established lunar landing
goal within the decade. Thus, the first major
adjustment of the MSFC organization was
recognized almost coincidentally with its
establishment as a part of NASA in 1960. The
challenge was to capture the very valuable
experience and knowledge gained from in house
design and development and to build an industrial
management organization around it. The
organization that ultimately evolved was not a
unique management concept. It was patterned
after other programs in which the project or
program manager was given full responsibility for
managing the available resources and for
establishing the proper balance among
performance, cost, and schedule. During the Apollo
era, the MSFC role was primarily development of
all propulsive stages of the launch vehicle systems;
therefore, a simplified matrix organization was
adequate to accomplish the technical management
of the program. The technical capability resulting
from the in house efforts of the late 1950s and early
1960s, coupled with a proven systems management
approach, contributed significantly to the success of
the Apollo program.
The second most important adjustment in the
MSFC organization came at the end of the Apollo
era. There were no agreed-to plans to build on or
even maintain the experienced government and
industry manned systems teams destined to become
surplus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was
particularly important to MSFC because its
primary focus remained launch vehicle
development. The solution encompassed two very
important items for any dynamic technical
management organization: the ability to (1)
reorganize and (2) diversify while maintaining its
vitality. Once the decision was made to diversify,
detailed planning, both short and long range, was
ffRI!X3EDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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essential. The MSFC success in this endeavor came
in the recognition that the project management
team and the majority of the technical disciplines
which had worked well for the Apollo Program were
relatively easy to adjust to meet the short-term
needs of the Skylab Program. This program, a
spinoff of Apollo, was assigned to MSFC for
management. The major organization adjustment
was to introduce a full matrix organization to
accommodate multiple program/project assign-
ments.
The most difficult task was the development of long
range plans. MSFC's 1969 reorganization
established a major new organizational entity: the
Program Development Directorate, chartered to
identify the most feasible future program(s)
compatible with the Center's technical expertise,
and then to ensure the proper skill mix for their
accomplishment. At that time, NASA's declining
workforce introduced an additional complication in
that reductions-in-force at MSFC were the rule
rather than the exception.
SPACELAB
One program which gave NASA and MSFC the
opportunity to exercise its system of technical
management and expand its diplomacy came with
the approval of the Spacelab Program, an
international cooperative program between the
European Space Agency (ESA), representing 10
European countries, and NASA, representing the
United States.
The genesis of this program came from the 1969
Space Task Group (STG) report to President Nixon.
Two of the STG recommendations concerned a
reusable launch system later to become the Space
Transportation System (STS); another covered the
internationalization of space. These recommenda-
tions had a major impact on Marshall. The early
concept and definition phase of STS utilization was
performed by the newly established Program
Development Directorate. This effort identified the
need for a manned laboratory to be carried in the
orbiter payload bay. The Laboratory would
accommodate the experiments, which were to
remain attached to the orbiter in low Earth orbit
and which would require human interface.
The Europeans joined the Spacelab Program
primarily to acquire a manned space flight
development capability within the European Space
Agency and the European aerospace industry. The
basic arrangement was for ESA to manage, at its
expense, and to an agreed-to set of requirements,
the production and operation of the Spacelab
spacecraft. Phases A and B were performed in
house by an MSFC-designated task team as part of
the NASA Shuttle payload planning and definition
effort. The principal drivers of the configuration
during the definition phase were Shuttle
accommodation (functional and physical interfaces)
and user requirements. Both were significant
variables throughout the program.
The fact that MSFC had the assignment to gather
Shuttle user requirements for NASA provided the
opportunity to canvass the U.S. scientific and
applications users for their needs, and to synthesize
these into a practical set of requirements in the
areas of power, data rate, weight, pointing
accuracy, volume, cooling, etc. The Shuttle
accommodations available to the payload--weight,
power, heat transfer, center of gravity (CG)
constraints and data capability were utilized to
bound the Spacelab system capabilities. Once the
initial user requirements and Shuttle
accommodations were established, even though
both continually changed, the problem facing the
Phase B definition effort was to optimize the
Spacelab configuration to provide a feasible system
with maximum capability for the user. The output
of the study came in the form of (1) a preliminary
orbiter interface document, (2) preliminary U.S.
user requirements which were later integrated with
European user requirements, and (3) preliminary
Spacelab system specifications. With these, NASA
had a good understanding of the program
requirements and a skeleton management
organization at MSFC and Headquarters. This
early program understanding proved to be
invaluable through the entire program. When ESA
agreed to participate in the program in 1973, the
results of all Spacelab-related study efforts were
provided directly to the Europeans. MSFC
terminated any further system definition studies in
order to concentrate the available manpower
resources on working with ESA and its contractors.
MSFC's early involvement in Spacelab planning
and definition, its experience with manned
spaceflight from Skylab, and its long history of
large pressure vessel (propellant tanks} design and
development made MSFC the logical NASA lead
center for Spacelab Program management.
At the beginning of the program, the political
planning phase was to some people on both sides of
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the ocean as important to program success as
program technical definition. It is not the intent
here to downplay that importance. On the contrary,
it proved during implementation and operation to
be vital. This planning culminated in two very
significant documents: (1) a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) signed by the respective
heads of NASA and the European Launch
Development Organization (ELDO), later renamed
the European Space Agency, and (2) a country-to-
country agreement approved by the U.S. State
Department and a representative of the 10
participating European countries.
It was evident that considerable thought and time
were spent to make the MOU clear, concise, and
easy to understand, yet general enough to allow the
implementers flexibility to complete the program
without the need to exercise the disputes clause. In
fact, the document was so well written that during
the development program there was never a
disagreement sufficient to warrant changing the
document.
IMPLEMENTATION
With such detailed planning, the implementation
and development phases would appear to be
relatively straightforward. In most programs, a
high degree of early planning will minimize the
problems commonly found in schedules, cost and
performance during the development phase. This
was true in Spacelab; however, a new set of
variables was introduced in working with the
Europeans. First, their industry did not have in
place boilerplate standards and specifications for
manned systems; these had to be developed.
Second, ESA had to translate NASA requirements
and specifications into its documentation system,
which resulted in a pyramid of very fluid
controlling documents, some of which required joint
signatures by NASA and ESA. One of the more
complex was the Interface Control Document (ICD)
for Spacelab and the orbiter, requiring approval by
NASA, ESA and the prime contractors for both
Spacelab and the orbiter. The complexity was
compounded by the Spacelab's dependence on the
orbiter for accommodations and the fact that the
two programs were being developed in parallel.
MSFC's early detailed planning revealed the
requirement for considerable NASA resources to
perform the technical evaluation and monitoring
necessary to ensure that the overall system
requirements and specifications were met, and to
perform the operations development planning at
KSC, JSC, and MSFC. It came as a surprise to
MSFC management when, early in the program,
the NASA Administrator questioned the level of
effort required by NASA civil servants to
technically evaluate and operate what was
concluded to be a free Spacelab.
NASA found itself in unfamiliar waters in working
with the Europeans, for whom a standard mode of
operation is to develop systems through multi-
national involvement. The key features of this
mode are the geographical distribution of funds to
each contributing country in an amount comparable
to that pledged to the program and the introduction
of the prime contractor and co-contractor rather
than subcontractor relationships. These features
were new to NASA but not to ESA, and the
anticipated shortcoming, i.e., the inability to select
the most competent subsystem contractor from each
country, was only a short-range concern. Until the
program had progressed beyond the critical design
reviews, and subsystem and component
development was well under way, there was a
constant concern that ESA lacked the technical
depth and breadth to manage such a large
undertaking. MSFC, however, took comfort in the
fact that an experience base did reside within
NASA and that the ESA management team was
dedicated to doing an outstanding job.
If one area had to be identified as a significant
concern resulting from NASA's lack of familiarity
with the ESA technical management system, it
would be the assurance that top level specifications
and requirements flowed from the prime contractor
to the co-contractor and ultimately to the vendors
and suppliers. This included traceability to indicate
how and if the requirements and specifications were
met. This became a real concern late in the
program, when adequate recorded evidence of
successful completion of qualification and
acceptance testing was sometimes lacking. There
was no question on the part of NASA engineers,
who had worked closely with ESA and its
contractors, that the qualification testing had taken
place; it was simply a matter of formally
documenting the data. This problem came about
because no contractual requirements for forrfial
documentation were placed on the co-contractor by
the prime contractor.
One of the first management decisions the Spacelab
Program Office made was to maintain heavy MSFC
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engineering involvement from the beginning to the
end of the program. This involvement was used to
generate and approve all technical requirements in
a way that the engineers felt accountable for the
technical performance of the Spacelab system even
though the overall responsibility resided with the
program manager. With the exception of
propulsion, all MSFC technical disciplines were
involved.
OPERATION
When the time came to provide the manpower
resources, there were three alternatives: (1] utilize
civil servants, (2) contract with a European
contractor, or (3) contract with a U.S. aerospace
firm. Using civil servants was not practical.
Contracting with the European Spacelab contractor
clearly had positive points; however, when long-
term cost implications of retaining a foreign
contractor in this country, not to mention that the
only past experience in the required mission
integration and launch operations resided in this
country, the decision to contract with the U.S.
aerospace industry came easily. The contract was
written with two schedules, one to include launch
operations and integration activities managed by
KSC, and the sustaining engineering and hardware
control administered by MSFC. The intent of the
latter schedule was to phase down the MSFC civil
service personnel from a peak during the
development phase as the contractor came on board
and the operations were well defined. This was
accomplished as planned. The program was well
into development when it was recognized that an
organizational interface with the user community
independent of the program office responsible for
the design and development should be established
at MSFC. This organization (Payload Project)
would ensure that the user requirements were
properly considered and ultimately satisfied where
practical. The new organization reported to the
center director, as did the Spacelab Program Office,
and assumed the very significant role of payload
mission planning and experiment analytical and
physical integration. The efforts of this
organization led to the establishment of the payload
and mission specialists training facility and the
Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) at
MSFC. The Spacelab payload mission successes can
be attributed more to this organization than to any
other single organization in NASA. This
organization and mode of operation will be used as a
model for the Space Station Freedom Program.
CONCLUSION
MSFC's approach to project management and
organizations has changed over the years, first to
develop a project management capability and then
to adapt to multiple projects utilizing a matrix
approach. The center weathered this to become a
very competent well-balanced research and
development organization with flexibility to adjust
to the nation's future space policy.
Building and maintaining such an organization
demands the constant attention of the entire
management structure. Even though it is not
practical or feasible to establish a detailed set of
standards and procedures to be used by each
manager and supervisor, there are a number of
common groundrules which allow any organization
to function efficiently and effectively. The following
are a few of the more important groundrules that
have proven to be helpful to MSFC:
(1) Emphasize the planning phase as the most
important part of any program. The more
detailed the program plan, the better it is
understood, and the more likely it is to be
successful. Proper organizational placement and
competence levels are essential.
(2) Develop and maintain an in house technical
capability through the careful selection of in
house projects and the recognition of the skills
required for future programs.
(3) Establish a good understanding with
Headquarters concerning what is expected of the
Center. This should be done on a project-by-
project basis.
(4) Require substantial involvement by the
technical discipline from the planning phase
through development and operation, but ensure
that overall program responsibility (cost,
schedule and performance) remains with the
program or project manager.
(5) Establish a Center strategic plan which is
understandable, realistic, and communicates to
every person at the Center his or her respective
role.
To manage a complex technical program through a
matrix organization with involvement from other
development and/or operation centers demands
constant attention to detail and involvement by all
4O
levels of center management. The concept of arm-
chair management, where the majority of the
manager's time is spent in the management
information control center concerning himself or
herself only with cost and schedule, has not been
acceptable in the past nor is it an acceptable mode
for the future of NASA.
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The Program and Project Management Training
and Development Initiative
by M. Peralta
NASA Associate Administrator for Management
After the Challenger accident, a study team headed
by General Sam Phillips conducted an assessment of
NASA's management practices. The team, known as
the NASA Management Study Group, conducted its
review and prepared a report for the Administrator.
A major recommendation was that NASA "institute
formal training and development programts) for
program/project managers."
This recommendation confirmed a similar one that
came from two project management workshops
conducted in 1975. That recommendation resulted in
the development of the Project Management Shared
Experiences Program (PMSEP). The one-week
PMSEP is an excellent interactive seminar, but it is
limited in size and scope and cannot fulfill all of the
agency's requirements.
The first step in implementing the Study Group's
recommendation was to conduct an in-house
requirements and feasibility study. This study,
completed in October 1987, reached the following
conclusions. First, the management of NASA
programs and projects is becoming increasingly
complex, and the demand for trained and experienced
personnel is increasing as the available pool is being
depleted. Second, in addition to our traditional
programs and projects, we now have training and
development requirements for people involved in
research, facilities, and information systems
activities that must be managed as projects. And
last, the total population contained in these groups is
approximately one-third of the NASA civil service
workforce.
To assist in developing NASA user requirements, the
study manager relied heavily on the project
management knowledge, skills, and experience data
developed at a Program and Project Management
colloquium held at Wallops Flight Center in 1980. In
addition to this most valuable data, interviews were
conducted and a questionnaire was administered to
approximately 125 NASA employees attending
agency development programs.
At the same time, we looked at what industry and the
Department of Defense were doing. We collected in-
depth information from 11 aerospace and non-
aerospace companies. We visited the Defense
Systems Management School at Ft. Belvoir, Va., and
also examined the many other excellent DoD
programs. In brief, we found the following:
• There are no quick fixes or magic bullets.
• There is a concentration on on-the-job training
combined with formal training.
• Advanced degrees are common and frequently
encouraged.
• Time in training varies from weeks to years.
Contractors and universities are frequently
used to design, develop, and deliver training
programs.
The average time in the project management
cycle, from entrance to project manager, is
about 15 years.
• There are similarities in curriculum content.
There are a number of readily available
project management training sources on the
market; however, they vary widely in
applicability and quality.
We completed our study with a look at several
university degree programs and an examination of
PRECFJ)(N_,} PA(7,'-E B,,ANK NC_'I_ _'ILMb;D
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what field centers were doing to train program and
project management personnel. Although many
centers offer short-term training opportunities, there
is no comprehensive, requirements-driven program
in place in NASA.
curriculum. A working group of the committee was
appointed to assist. After three iterations, we have
agreement on the model shown below.
Some important features of this model are:
All of these findings were reported to the NASA
Program Project Management Steering Group. This
group, established in 1984, consists of members from
the field centers and Headquarters program offices
who have broad knowledge and experience in
program and project management. The Group assists
NASA management by providing a focus, although
somewhat limited, for this most important function.
The group has been active in reestablishing the
Project Management Shared Experiences Program,
has provided input to the Phillips Study Group, and
advises management on appropriate NASA
Management Instructions (NM[s).
The Steering Group accepted the study findings and
tasked the study manager with developing a NASA
training and development model complete with
• A commitment to training and
development at any point in the cycle
• A partnership between the field centers and
NASA Headquarters in the design and
delivery of core curriculum
• Where practical, informal career paths and
development plans will be used
• Training consists of knowledge and skills
• A modular design will be employed
• An employee may enter or exit the cycle at
any appropriate level
PROGRAM/PROJECT MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
NASA MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT ANDTRAINING OF PROJECT
MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL
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The working group also spent much time developing
the core curriculum for the Advanced Project
Management Course. It was decided to concentrate
on this level due to a pressing need in this area. The
core curriculum includes program/project planning,
business management, technical management,
acquisition reviews, and lessons learned. The first
offering of the Advanced Project Management Course
occurred in October 1988. Pilot courses in systems
engineering and program control were offered this
past summer.
In addition to training courses, a number of related
activities were also undertaken. It is widely agreed
that we must build on our past experience in
managing programs and projects. To do this we must
collect and disseminate the lessons learned and
shared experience of past and present management
teams. A pilot lessons-learned videotape is presently
being prepared. Using the "lessons learned" from
this pilot, we hope, with the cooperation of the NASA
Alumni League, to document our experiences from
Apollo to the present. We also plan to use live
interactive television productions to deliver issues of
interest to our program and project management
workforce. We will soon establish a pilot computer
network that will give us the potential for electronic
mentoring. This publication, Issues in NASA
Program and Proiect Management, is a direct result
of our intention to capture and pass on our heritage
and culture in the hope that some of this information
will be of direct and immediate benefit to our
workforce.
Our workforce is key to the agency's success, and this
requires a highly motivated and competent staff.
This is particularly challenging today because of the
growing complexity of the agency's activities. As a
result of the program/project management initiative,
the agency has underscored its commitment to
providing the very best training and development for
our program and project workforce as well as
providing them with the tools they need to meet the
future challenges associated with the NASA mission.
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Resources
Weekly Online Update Tool for Managers
Did you know that there is a weekly current
awareness service entitled Managers on
NASA/RECON? Are you interested in new
developments in space commercialization,
Congressional and legislative reports, new business
methods and trends, research and development
programs, and many more timely subjects?
Every Monday morning a list of twenty citations
(including books) is compiled. Items of interest to
managers and administrators of NASA
Headquarters, NASA Centers, and NASA
Contractors are selected for pertinence to NASA's
mission, management, and foreign technology
exchange.
Any NASA/RECON user may utilize the service by
executing the Managers stored search from within
File Collections A, B, D, N, O, and P, as follows:
QUERY EXECUTE MANAGERS (NAHQ).
Once the stored search has ceased execution, simply
use the DISPLAY, BROWSE, or TYPE command to
review the results.
Some of the subject areas covered by the weekly
service are:
Current aerospace technology on present and
future NASA space missions, including
aerospace medicine.
• Technologies of the European space programs as
well as those of the U.S.S.R. and Japan.
New management methods, business trends, and
policies concerning procurement, financial,
contract, personnel, and research management.
Congressional and legislative reports, Federal
budgets, and appropriations of the NASA
programs.
• New developments in database management
systems.
• Current reports on international trade, market
research, and economics.
• Current research in artificial intelligence, expert
systems, and robotic technology.
• Current technology transfer, assessment, and
utilization.
• Current reports on international relations,
cooperation, and space law.
Project Management: A Systems Approach to
Planning, Scheduling, and Controlling, second
edition, by Harold Kerzner, 1984. Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., New York.
Since his first edition just 10 years ago, Dr. Kerzner,
a professor of systems management at Balwin-
Wallace College and president of Cleveland-based
Project Management Associates consulting firm, has
expanded his college-level textbook to 937 pages. As
a textbook, it contains a couple of final exams
(multiple choice), 332 discussion questions, and 42
case studies. As a resource for managers and
executives, it suffers from a thin and faulty index,
making it difficult to look up needed information
quickly. Nevertheless, the book is of value to those
who desire a lengthy and broad overview of project
management, as well as useful tips and ideas for
management problem-solving. It is the leading book
in a narrow field.
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While NASA defines a program as a related series of
efforts which continue over a long period of time,
designed to pursue a broad scientific or technical
goal, and a _ as a defined, time-limited activity
with clearly established objectives and boundary
conditions executed to gain knowledge, create a
capability or provide a service--this book uses the
terms interchangeably in the index and rarely
mentions program management in the text. Instead,
the author creates a hierarchy of line managers who
answer to the project manager who in turn answers
to a functional manager or executive. Thus, his gag
definition: "Project management is the art of
creating the illusion that any outcome is the result of
a series of predetermined, deliberate acts when, in
fact, it was dumb luck."
Dr. Kerzner traces the concept of project
management to its birth in the 1960s in aerospace,
defense and construction, maintaining that the
concept took off in the early 1980s and is the wave of
the future in management techniques. Complexity
and diversity set in during the late 1960s, forcing
some companies to accept project management
reluctantly. However, the real breakthrough came
in 1970 when "NASA and the Department of Defense
'forced' subcontractors into accepting project
management."
Likewise, the textbook is built around systems
theory as opposed to other traditional or more
conventional management theory. Management-by-
objectives, for examples, places too much emphasis
on the end item or goal, with little regard for people.
Behavioral theory emphasizes human relations
(person and job) or social relations (cultural
relationships which involve social change). Decision
theory, on the other hand, is too rational, using
mathematical or scientific models. The empirical
school of thought emphasizes the study of
experiences of other managers, but all too often,
situations are not similar. That leaves systems
theory, which, in this text, is part and parcel of
project management.
"Project management utilizes the systems approach
to management by having functional personnel (the
vertical hierarchy} assigned to a specific project (the
horizontal hierarchy)," Dr. Kerzner says in his
definition which guides the text. The systems
approach is not clearly defined, roughly "a group of
elements (that} can act as a whole toward achieving
some common goal, objective, or end." More
specifically, one of the hundreds of charts in the text
indicates that the systems approach starts with an
objective shaped by constraints, which is broken into
requirements and then alternatives, leading to trade-
offs (in terms ofcost, time, performance or policy}.
The first attempts to mark the boundaries of systems,
programs and projects are attributed to the U.S. Air
Force and NASA, but the text does not cite sources or
indicate when such distinctions were made.
Essentially, the text views project management as a
"coordinative" function and matrix management as a
"collaborative" function. Problems result when there
is dual accountability between project manager and
functional manager, and when there is a difference of
opinion. Thus, in a matrix organization, the project
manager "must continually negotiate," calling for
interpersonal and communication skills.
The book does seem to indicate that a modified
matrix organization is superior to both a pure
functional structure and a pure product
organizational structure, especially for labor-
intensive projects, but not capital-intensive ones.
Project management does have a downside, the
author notes. The main risk, observed in missile and
space programs, is falling in love more with job than
family. You know if you are to the edge if you take
work home or on vacation. You know if you are over
the edge if you consider 5 p.m. as the working day
half over, or if you come in Friday and realize there
are only two more working days until Monday.---
WML
Project Management Handbook, edited by David I.
Cleland and William R. King, 1983. Von Nostrand
Reinhold Co., New York.
Although this "handbook" bills itself variously as a
reference guide and how-to manual, it is really a
collection of articles clustered around certain themes
such as life cycle management and project planning.
Most of the 35 articles come from college professors of
management, and more from the University of
Pittsburgh than any other college. David Cleland is
a professor of engineering management there, and
William King is a professor of business
administration there also. Five articles are co-
authored, including one by Cleland and King on
linear responsibility charts.
Two of the best articles in this book are from Fred
Holenbach of the Bechtel Power Company. In one, he
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discusses project control at Bechtel in a no-nonsense,
step-by-step manner. In the other, he outlines the
advantages and disadvantages of tbe matrix
approach, concluding simply: "The success of a
project manager is measured by client satisfaction as
a result of getting the job done on time and within
budget."
Other articles, especially from the academics, are
more esoteric. Readers who do not understand
stochastic network analysis or cultural ambience
may not even attempt articles with such terms in the
titles. Technical terms and complex charts abound in
this book which claims to be more pragmatic than
theoretical.
background, education or just plain flat personality.
Finally, there's the power specialist who is admired
by social regulars but no one else because of a
tendency to buck authority.
Yet, Project Management Handbook is useful even if
it is not comprehensive, up to date and consistent.
The "Behavioral Dimensions of Project
Management" section has some good material on
leadership, worthy of reflection and analysis. Each of
the eight sections starts with a brief description of
each article, and the different points of view may be
of more value than a single author attempting to
cover the whole field, from conceptual phase to
phasing-out and evaluation.--WML
Admittedly missing in this "handbook" are chapters
on configuration management and value
engineering, which the editors describe as "parochial
interests," yet regarded as important in the
aerospace industry.
In 724 pages, only four references to NASA are listed
in the index, most of them clustered in a section
called "The Successful Application of Project
Management." One article in this section seems to be
based upon a 1974 study by Murphy, Baker and
Fisher on "Determinants of Project Success,"
sponsored by NASA (NGR 22-03-028). Actually,
there are other references to NASA in this book,
despite the index. The very first chapter, for
example, tells how General Phillips came into the
Apollo Program in 1963 and created one of the first
successful matrix organizations, with 120 persons at
the headquarters program office managing upwards
of 30,000 persons in three Centers. NASA life-cycle
management is discussed near the middle of the
book. Twice, NASA studies are cited in an article at
the end of the book, but not indexed. More so than
other books, reference books need to be fully and
accurately indexed for users as a reader service.
One of the liveliest pieces in the handbook is by Dr.
Thomas E. Miller of the University of Missouri-
Kansas City. Although it focuses on managing
change in a fire department, the article describes
four natural groups seen around any office. There
are the technical-specialist organizational types who
tend to be productive but standoffish. The social-
specialist regulars are outgoing, popular and
accepted by everyone except top management. Then
there are the "underchosen" who are loved by
management but who are out of line with peers and
subordinates because of age, competence, ethnic
Project Manager Game, by Nancy Bingham, 1988.
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA.
An employee at Ames Research Center has devised a
game that should put Monopoly out of business, at
least among project managers in NASA.
Nancy Bingham's Project Manager Game is in
production at the Ames Graphics Department, with
about 50 boards and sets of gamecards set for the first
of what may become many press runs.
According to the draft rules, the boardgame consists
of bonus and penalty points in three categories:
technical quality, cost and schedule. The objectives
are "to perform your job as project manager to deliver
the best technical, high-quality product at the least
cost and minimum development time."
Like most boardgames, this one is driven by a pawn
moving forward at the roll of a single die. The board
itself is divided into four "phases": requirements
definition, project planning, project performance and
project closeout.
Each phase consists of spaces along the board, some
of them labeled "crisis" and "zap." The player
landing on a crisis space draws a crisis card which
presents a problem and three possible alternatives,
some of which will cost points. For example, here's
one from the first phase:
Project funding is cut by 25% after requirements are
finalized.
A) descope project to meet budget.
B) advocate additional funding.
C) assume budget risk (buy-in).
49
Resources
If you select "A", you lose 15 points in technical
quality (TQ), 10 points in cost (C), and 10 points in
schedule (S). Choose "B" and you lose 15 points in C
and 15 points in S. If you chose "C", you lose 15
points in TQ, 20 points in C, and 10 points in S.
The other set of cards, zap cards, may be given to
another player at certain times. Here's one from the
project planning phase:
All internal manpower is already assigned to key
projects. You'll have to hire to fill your project's
positions. Subtract 15 points for TQ, 10 points for C
and 20 points for S.
The idea behind zap cards is connected to the "zero
sum game" often played for real in companies. In
other words, your requirements for resources will
affect the other projects going on in the company at
the same time.
Gradually, each player advances along the board,
facing crises or getting zapped until bonus points are
awarded for reaching the next phase.
that the cost of administering projects can be half or
more of total costs, so the project should be measured
from all angles.
Out of the Crisis, by W. Edwards Deming, 1988. MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
The guru of Japanese management, Deming, now 88,
issues a new edition of his classic study in his
twilight years. Foremost among the new corporate
folklore principles here is his 85-15 Rule: production
problems are the result of workers only 15 percent of
the time; the rest is caused by management. In direct
opposition to "search for excellence" theories, he is
appalled at MBWA, management by wandering
about, because most managers do not ask the right
questions nor stop walking long enough to get the
right answers. He deplores the whole idea of
management-by-objectives, and he opposes
performance appraisals and quality circles, the latter
beyond management responsibility. What does he
like? Dedication to quality which is contagious,
spreading to an increase in productivity, a decrease
of cost, satisfied customers and happy workers.
But a project manager's career is not that simple or
worry-free. At each of the four progress spaces, the
player must draw both a crisis card and a zap card.
The zinger, however, is at the end of the game. Most
games end with the winner as the person with the
most points. Ms. Bingham notes: "Other
considerations may disqualify the winner with the
most points. These will be explained at the end of the
game." Sound familiar?--WML
In Brief
Management: A Bibliography for NASA Managers
(NASA SP-7500) Scientific and Technical
Information Division, annual. This is a selection of
annotated references to unclassified reports and
journal articles that are introduced into the NASA
scientific and technical information system. Items
are selected on the basis of their usefulness to NASA
mangers, and they are grouped into 20 categories
ranging from Human Factors and Personnel Issues to
Management Theory and Techniques. They are
indexed six ways. Available from the National
Technical Information Service.
Managing Proiects in Organizations, by J. Davidson
Frame, 1987. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.
This 240-page book is written primarily for those
involved in information systems projects, claiming
that the same project management techniques that
yield products can be applied to information systems
as well. Frame recommends a focus on people,
though, not techniques, recommending the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator. [n a requirements section, he
claims that most projects are started too soon. In a
third section, on tools and techniques, Frame notes
NASA/SCAN: Selected Current Aerospace Notices.
Scientific and Technical Information Division,
semimonthly. SCAN is a current awareness
publication covering a full spectrum of aeronautic
and aerospace information, segmented into about 75
categories, including management. Each SCAN
topic resembles a newsletter and can be customized
for an individual. SCAN topics are available free to
NASA employees, university libraries, and
contractors registered with the NASA Scientific and
Technical Information Facility. Others may
subscribe at a nominal charge.
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